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ABSTRACT 
 
 James Dobson is a pediatric psychologist best known as the figurehead of 
Focus on the Family, an important social conservative organization that helped 
to define the American Right’s concept of “family values.” The books, videotapes, 
and radio broadcast about parenting that Dobson produced in seventies and 
eighties, particularly the bestselling Dare to Discipline (1970), were particularly 
important for shaping arguments used by the conservative side of what we now 
call “the culture wars.” During the past three decades, Dobson has become an 
increasingly prominent participant in partisan politics, but his career as a public 
figure is built atop his work as parenting expert. 
A defining aspect of Dobson’s career is his deployment of agentive 
interdiscursivity. Through careful fusions of arguments drawn both from his 
expertise as a psychologist and from religion, Dobson’s rhetoric give moral and 
political force to arguments about professional uncertainties. Dobson is a 
seminal figure in contemporary American politics, and rhetorical strategies he 
pioneered in his books about parenting continue to define American social 
conservatism. Describing Dobson’s work as a rhetorical project which depends 
on interdiscursivity complicates notions of agency, equips scholars to better 
understand rhetorical strategies still used by the Religious Right, and suggests 
new starting points for discussing expertise in public life.
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION: HOW INTERDISCURSIVITY BUILDS WORLDVIEWS 
 
 During the 1970s and 80s, conservative Evangelicalism, aided by its 
conservative Catholic allies, emerged as an important political force in the 
United States. While the Religious Right’s reputation has suffered in recent years 
as it has fallen increasingly out of step with more and more Americans on issues 
like LGBT rights and contraception, it remains an important part of our political 
landscape, and American debates about education, sexuality, marriage, and 
abortion are unintelligible without some understanding of conservative 
Christianity. The most high profile rhetors associated with the Religious Right 
include controversial religious figures like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson and 
prominent conservative politicians who make religious appeals a central part of 
their campaign platforms (e.g. Rick Santorum). However noteworthy famous 
figures like those might be, rhetoricians interested in the American Right should 
be careful not to overlook the less conspicuous work of describing and 
maintaining social conservatism as a perspective concerned with practical 
problems. Policy debate matters, but partisanship is also constructed through 
arguments about everyday life.  A key figure responsible for initiating and 
sustaining this less remarked upon but equally crucial project is James Dobson.   
 Dobson, the founder and guiding influence on an organization called 
Focus on the Family, is a pediatric psychologist (he has a PhD from University of 
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Southern California) who, in the early 70s, gained fame as a parenting expert 
who advocated the use of corporal punishment. In 1976, he left his career as 
psychologist and in 1977 founded Focus on the Family, an organization that 
distributes practical, professionally informed advice about parenting and 
marriage (along with occasional forays into more specialized topics like abuse, 
addiction, and depression) to an Evangelical audience, not only through its 
ubiquitous radio show, but also through its website, pamphlets, magazines, and 
books. Focus on the family also maintains a network of professional therapists 
who answer letters and emails individually. Through its massive, coordinated 
efforts to provide therapeutic advice, Focus on the Family has helped to shape 
conservative conceptions of family values for over three decades.  Focus on the 
Family has influenced political debates in essential ways, even while it rejects the 
implication that it is politically driven, and the disconnect between Focus on the 
Family’s political influence and its own claims as an apolitical entity points to its 
sophisticated use of rhetorical agency, a concept of increasing interest to 
language and communication scholars.  
Today’s scholars widely agree that agency is no longer the possession of 
autonomous individuals, but it is the product of social interactions and 
authoritative moments and spaces. Carl Herndl and Adele Licona, for example, 
argue that in order to exert influence, one must recognize where and when 
within the elements of a situation exists an opportunity for efficacy. They argue 
that “agency is a social location and opportunity into and out of which rhetors, 
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even postmodern subjects, move” (134). Where were such opportunities in a 
career as a pediatric psychologist or a public expert about parenting? What 
agentive strategies allowed James Dobson to shape American political discourse 
from within a largely apolitical therapeutic project? 
 My contention, which I will explicate through close readings of important 
texts from Dobson’s career, is that Dobson occupies such a powerful position in 
American public life because of his judicious deployment of agentive 
interdiscursivity. By agentive interdiscursivity, I mean that Dobson uses 
strategies that combine multiple discourses together in a way that creates a 
politically implicated view of reality. Buttressed by his authority as a professional 
expert, Dobson linked controversies within mental health care to a vision of the 
world as a place of moral uncertainty and intellectual chaos. Because of his 
strategic use of multiple discourses, particularly from mental health care and 
religion, Dobson was able to exert considerable political influence while 
remaining independent from conventional partisan politics.  
In this opening chapter, I will survey Dobson’s career, and I will explain 
why agentive interdiscursivity, which is my derivation from Ernesto Laclau’s and 
Chantal Mouffe’s articulation theory, is an important rhetorical strategy.  I will 
then discuss my methodological choice of concept oriented criticism, and finally, 
I will preview the rest of the dissertation. I hope that my project not only allows 
for better insight into Dobson’s work, but that it also leaves rhetoric better 
equipped to discuss the balance of rhetorical forces that enabled the Religious 
4 
 
 
Right’s ascendency and continues to fuel the success of American conservatism. 
This project also suggests new ways to discuss the role of expertise in policy 
debate.  James Dobson’s legacy as a rhetor is a complex and important one, not 
only because his books, lectures, and radio work fostered the creation of a vast 
and important Evangelical mental health project, but also because the texts that 
enabled his success are rich cases for thinking about rhetoric and public life. 
Who is James Dobson and what did he accomplish? 
James Dobson, the son of a traveling Nazarene Evangelist, and the 
grandson and great-grandson of ministers, graduated with a psychology degree 
from a Nazarene college near Los Angeles called Pasadena College in 1958, and 
he earned a PhD from USC in 1967. A brief sketch of his family history and early 
biography suggests the novelty of his appearance as a public figure during the 
early seventies, as during the sixties, psychology was sometimes stigmatized in 
the Evangelical Christian community. At Pasadena, Dobson was influenced by 
Paul Culbertson, a pioneer of Christian psychology who “supplement[ed] 
textbooks with his own teachings because the field was so new” (Gilgoff 21). 
After receiving his PhD, Dobson began a successful career as a psychologist, 
teaching at USC’s Keck School of Medicine and working as a therapist at USC’s 
Children’s Hospital. During this period, Dobson oversaw a multimillion dollar 
study about children with developmental difficulties, worked as a family 
counselor, and worked as an assistant to Paul Popenoe, an important figure in 
the history of therapy who helped to invent marriage counseling.   
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Popenoe wrote the foreword to Dare to Discipline (1970), the book that 
launched Dobson as a public figure. Dare to Discipline’s central argument is that 
the social unrest of the late sixties was a direct result of the advocacy of 
“permissive” parenting by popular parenting experts of the postwar period, 
particularly Benjamin Spock. Not only was Dare to Discipline Dobson’s first 
foray into popular writing, it was an immediate sensation, particularly because 
of Dobson’s fiery advocacy of corporal punishment. By 1972 Dare to Discipline 
was so widely understood as a conservative touchstone that a copy of the book 
was specially bound and added to the White House library, and it has gone on to 
sell three million copies (Buss 45).1 Dare to Discipline’s reputation as pro-
spanking polemic is somewhat at odds with what the book actually is. While it 
does contain inflammatory passages advocating corporal punishment, Dare to 
Discipline has a much broader agenda than the advocacy of spanking. For 
Dobson, “discipline” is an attitude toward moral order that encompasses every 
facet of society, and although Dobson believed that the family was the site where 
this “discipline” was primarily instilled, Dare to Discipline talks about a wide 
spectrum of sites where it had, in his view, lapsed, including schools and the 
mental health profession.2 
After Dare to Discipline’s success, Dobson began booking speaking 
engagements, often at churches and PTA meetings, and he began making 
appearances in the popular media. Dobson followed Dare to Discipline with 
other books, and while none of them had the same impact as Dare to Discipline, 
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Dobson’s work from the seventies, including What Wives Wish Their Husbands 
Knew about Women (1975) and The Strong Willed Child (1978), established the 
themes that Dobson expounded upon for the rest of his career.  In 1976, Dobson 
took a sabbatical from teaching at USC and from working at Children’s Hospital 
to focus on his speaking career. In 1977, as a way to avoid the constant travel a 
career as a paid speaker entailed, Dobson released, through a Christian 
publishing house, a bestselling series of videotapes of his lectures called Focus 
on the Family, primarily to evangelical churches.  
The success of the Focus on the Family tapes was a turning point in 
Dobson’s life, as it led to the launch of a radio show that aired on religious 
stations, also called Focus on the Family. The show, delivered in a talk show 
format, discussed parenting and marriage in a way that combined Dobson’s 
expertise as a therapist with a moralistic, religious vision of the family.3  Dobson 
was something of a cutting edge figure in the Christian media world. In 1977, the 
burgeoning Evangelical popular culture we have today did not yet exist, and 
Dobson’s professional, issue oriented (rather than strictly religious) work was 
groundbreaking. Jeb Jackson, who worked for Dobson during the seventies and 
became a member of Focus on the Family’s board of directors reports: “The 
majority of Christian radio programing at that time was pastors who would edit 
their preaching from a Sunday service and put it on the radio. [. . .] There 
weren’t many talk shows. There were shows with missionaries and about church 
people doing things, but this was different” (Gilgoff 25).  
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During the eighties, the Focus on the Family organization expanded into a 
ubiquitous Evangelical media empire. Not only did the radio show air on over 
800 stations by the end of the decade, but Focus on the Family began to produce 
magazines, books, and educational materials. One of the more unique 
developments that occurred during this period, and a development that suggests 
how primarily therapeutic (rather than conventionally political) Focus on the 
Family’s mission was, was that Focus began to keep a network of licensed 
counselors to answer the thousands of requests for advice that the organization 
received.  During the early 90s, the organization moved to a large campus in 
Colorado Springs. At that time, Focus on the Family’s budget was approximately 
80 million dollars (Buss 118-119). Presently, Focus’s radio show, still the 
centerpiece of the ministry, reaches over 200 million people internationally 
(Daily). 
Even though Dobson’s career has primarily been that of a public expert 
about parenting, he has sometimes participated in more traditional political 
activity like public service and political advocacy, and these activities have 
allowed him to exert considerable influence over the direction of the organized 
American Right. In 1981 Dobson founded the Family Research Council, a 
lobbying organization devoted to promoting social conservatism.4 Dobson was 
also an important public figure during the Reagan administration, serving on 
Reagan’s National Advisory Commission to the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention from 1982-1984, on the Citizens Advisory Panel for Tax 
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Reform as a Co-Chair, on the United States Army’s Family Initiative from 1986-
1988, and on the Meese Commission on Pornography from 1985-1986. After the 
election of Bill Clinton, Dobson emerged as a more forceful voice for the right, 
and he became increasingly engaged in political advocacy. Even though Dobson’s 
emergence as a more conventional political figure was primarily an antagonistic 
response to liberalism, he has been something of a gadfly to a Republican party 
that has not honored its social conservative rhetoric with legislative action. 
Dobson has thus helped to push the GOP rightward on issues like same-sex 
marriage and abortion.  
By the late nineties, Dobson had so much clout in conservative circles and 
had become so outspoken and uncompromising that he attracted attention 
within beltway circles with threats to, in Glenn Utter’s and John Storey’s words, 
“wreak havoc on Republicans unless the party delivered on issues of importance 
to religious and social conservatives” (83.) In response to his controversial 
reputation, Dobson said “My goal is not to see the Republican Party prosper” 
(Wilcox and Robinson 64). In 1997 Dobson signed, along with other Evangelical 
leaders and Catholic bishops and archbishops, a document called “We Hold 
These Truths: A Statement of Christian Conscience and Citizenship.” Damon 
Linker writes that although the document “received little attention from the 
mainstream media, its message reached millions of devoutly religious 
Americans” through churches, newsletters, radio programs, lobbying 
organizations, and the Catholic press (109). As a response to tensions between 
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the more pragmatic approach favored by political organizers like Ralph Reed 
and the outspoken approach of figures like Dobson, in 2002 The Arlington 
Group, a collection of social conservative leaders, including Dobson, banded 
together to coordinate their efforts. The Religious Right’s push for a 
Constitutional amendment forbidding same-sex marriage during the 2004 
elections was largely a response to this coordination and James Dobson’s 
uncompromising position (Gilgoff 141-142).   
Even though the last two decades of Dobson’s career have found him 
increasingly involved in more conventional political activity, his life’s work 
remains that of a therapist involved in public outreach, and Focus on the Family 
has remained, until very recently, his primary vehicle for engaging the public. In 
a surprisingly sympathetic profile of Focus on the Family, journalist Donna 
Minkowitz writes, “ . . . niceness, in so many ways, is what Focus is all about, and 
the reason you probably haven't heard of it, despite its power.[ . . .] Focus's 
agenda of helping people in pain isn't just cheap icing it throws on to distract us 
from its right-wing cake . . . .” 5  During the past decade, Dobson gradually 
reduced his involvement in Focus on the Family, and in 2010, he separated 
himself completely. These changes were carried out to ensure an orderly 
transition for Focus (especially important because Dobson was so closely 
associated with the organization) and to allow Dobson a sort of phased 
retirement. Dobson now leads a smaller organization called Family Talk. From 
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Family Talk, Dobson still gives regular addresses on the radio and sends out 
emails and newsletters about current events to subscribers.  
James Dobson, articulation theory, and the American Right  
My biographical sketch already begins to suggest Dobson’s importance to 
American social conservatism, but a deeper look at the way that his rhetoric 
presents a well-developed conservative philosophy to a popular audience 
suggests that his impact has been even bigger than his conventional 
contributions to national politics suggest. When Dobson was establishing 
himself as a public figure during the 1970s, social conservatism was in the 
process of becoming an organized force. Activist organizations like Phyllis 
Schlafly’s Eagle Forum (1972) and Jerry Fallwell’s Moral Majority (1979) came 
into being, and The American Christian Cause (1974) and The Christian Voice 
(1978) were founded to help conservative Christians politically organize. James 
Dobson’s contribution to this burgeoning movement was to forge important new 
connections between mental health care, religion, and politics. Not only did he 
help to found a project that is now an important part of the infrastructure of 
American conservatism, but the rhetorical strategy Dobson used, which 
combines a paradoxical rhetoric of anti-elite expertise with a moralistic rhetoric 
of timeless traditional values, was an important precursor to strategies used by 
contemporary American conservatism.  As I suggested in the preceding section, 
Dobson uses his authority as a parenting expert and the authority of religious 
rhetoric to construct a critique of contemporary liberalism, which he argues has 
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compromised the integrity of institutional life and undermined social order. For 
Dobson, arguments about the family are also arguments about society and 
morality. While a moralistic view of the family is not in and of itself novel, 
Dobson’s strategy for politicizing the family, which involves making seemingly 
incongruous connections between arguments about psychology, religious 
rhetoric, and right wing populism, was new. 
 This interdiscursivity Dobson used to politicize the family is what Laclau’s 
and Mouffe’s articulation theory, as explicated in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, predicts. Their view of political work, sometimes called articulation 
theory (and which is an extrapolation of Gramsci’s hegemonic theory), is that 
politics is done through the articulation— both iteration and extension— of 
disparate, incommensurable discourses.  (This kind of “incommensurability” 
recalls Feyerabend’s ironic invocation of the concept rather than the Kuhnian 
problem that rhetoricians have more often used as a point of departure.) For 
Laclau and Mouffe, political work is a struggle to control the connotations of 
language and to connect together different discourses in an effort to enroll 
people into a particular worldview: “we will call articulation any practice 
establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a 
result of the articulatory practice” (105). For Laclau and Mouffe this kind of 
rhetorical work is, quite literally, everything:  
Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive 
practices. It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of 
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discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition 
of emergence; and b) that any distinction between what are usually called 
the linguistic and behavioral aspects of a social practice, is either an 
incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within 
the social production of meaning  which is structured under the form of 
discursive totalities. (107) 
Politics is not the struggle of people who are connected for historical reasons, 
nor is it debate about specific policy issues; it is instead the linking together of 
diverse ways of understanding reality into a worldview into which people are 
enrolled.  
 As anti-realist (or perhaps merely cynical?) as Laclau’s and Mouffe’s view 
of political work sounds, there is quite a distance between their position and the 
postmodern straw man. Lauclau and Mouffe insist on discourse as the medium 
of all politics because discourse is not essentialist or inevitable. There is no 
particular reason that any particular group of people will understand its social or 
economic predicament in any particular way, and there is nothing essential 
about scientific, professional, or technical discourses that make them immune to 
appropriation by political partisans. Laclau and Mouffe insist that political 
identity (and social class) cannot be understood strictly in terms of material 
circumstance, but in terms of the articulations and disarticulations between 
people, material reality, and symbols; “the category of articulation acquires a 
different theoretical status: articulation is now a discursive practice which does 
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not have a plane of constitution prior to, or outside, the dispersion of the 
articulated elements” (109). What matters for the observer trying to understand 
how people are enrolled into public identities are not economic or sociological 
facts, but how various interpretations of those facts are combined together into 
worldviews.   
 One reason that Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is particularly 
appropriate for framing James Dobson’s work is that the book was written as an 
effort to understand the success of the American right under Reagan. Laclau’s 
and Mouffe’s theory, which is an extension of Laclau’s earlier work on populism 
(1977),  was originally written as a response to the very same right wing populist 
movement that Dobson helped to construct and later helped to intensify. In 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s account, during the late seventies and early eighties, 
relationships between various strands of conservative thought, including 
conservative Evangelicalism, libertarianism, and neo-conservatism, were 
reimagined and combined into a new conservative “common sense” that defined 
the ground upon which American policy debates happened.  This description 
matches perfectly some strategies explicitly endorsed by influential conservative 
intellectuals as early as the 1960s, particularly National Review editor William 
F. Buckley and political theorist Frank Meyer. Meyer coined the term 
“fusionism” to describe his argument for the construction of a robust coalition of 
libertarians, political conservatives, and Evangelical Christians (along with 
conservative Catholics like Buckley). The similarity of “fusionism” to 
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“articulation” suggests something of a match between the deliberate strategies of 
the conservative thinkers who helped pave the way for the political realignment 
that happened under Reagan in the 1980s and the version of hegemonic theory 
that Laclau and Mouffe designed to explain these political shifts.   
Methodology: Concept oriented criticism and agentive 
interdiscursivity 
 
My exploration of Dobson is an exploration of how articulation takes 
place within a specific body of work, and my development of agentive 
interdiscursivity as a key concept is an effort to transform Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
insightful discussion about how partisanship and public identity function into a 
lens for close reading. If we follow Laclau’s and Mouffe’s logic, conservatives are 
bound together not by economics, tradition, or geography, but by the ways they 
describe the world, and if we want to think about how rhetors construct these 
descriptions, we need to pay special attention to how different ways of seeing 
reality have been connected to each other.  It is no wonder that James Dobson, 
who recognized that mental health expertise and religion could be articulated 
together to make the family an important site for political work, should have 
been an important figure in the evolution of the American conservative project. 
While it is reductive to say that James Dobson was successful simply because he 
expressed conservative moral concern through arguments derived from both 
mental health care and religion, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that such 
interdiscursive strategies are important for meaningful participation in 
arguments about social reality.  
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Criticism that seeks to develop a theory through analysis has sometimes 
been called “concept oriented criticism.” James Jasinki writes that concept 
oriented criticism “[does] not advance a method to be imitated [but] rather 
advance[s] a conceptual equation in need of additional exploration” (139). 
Concept oriented criticism has become a dominant mode of criticism in rhetoric. 
Stephanie Houston Grey writes: “Rather than identify themselves with one 
methodology or template, many critics now prefer to allow texts of cultural 
significance to suggest interesting conceptual questions” (341). Concept oriented 
criticism is a particularly useful method for deploying articulation theory 
because the affordances that the tradition of close reading and hegemonic theory 
might offer each other have yet to be deeply explored. While Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy includes several specific examples that demonstrate how 
language animates the politics of the American right, it does not engage in 
anything resembling the kind of sustained attention that close reading demands. 
Similarly, other rhetoricians have used Laclau and Mouffe in their work, but no 
one has explored agentive interdiscursivity, which is central to Laclau’s and 
Mouffe’s work (although they do not use that particular phrase) to examine 
strategies that might lead to rhetorical efficacy.  
This critical approach is, to use Jasinski’s language, a practice of 
“abduction,” “a back-and-forth movement between the critical object . . . and the 
concept(s) that is being investigated simultaneously,” rather than an orderly, 
methodologically guided deduction that seeks to uncover the characteristics of 
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the object of study (139). Concept oriented criticism does attempt to understand 
how a text functions through close reading, but it is equally concerned with 
exploring the value of a particular theoretical frame (or “concept”). The idea of 
concept oriented criticism is to perform a close reading of a text, but the close 
reading is to be guided by the interests and insights afforded by the given 
concept. When done well, concept oriented criticism affords insights into both 
the text being analyzed and the conceptual frame being employed. In my case, 
the texts are important moments from James Dobson’s career, and the frame is 
agentive interdiscursivity, which is my extrapolation from Laclau and Mouffe. 
My exploration of how interdiscursivity can be used to create agency 
shares some goals and theoretical assumptions with Michael McGee’s 
ideographic criticism. Michael McGee’s influential work takes traditional close 
textual analysis to task for enshrining the text as an independent, bounded 
object of analysis. McGee argues that rhetorical criticism should be the 
examination and reconstruction of significant textual fragments: “The 
apparently finished discourse is in fact a dense reconstruction of all the bits of 
other discourses from which it was made.” McGee also argues that the rhetorical 
critic’s job is to reconstruct new texts by linking together artifacts that share 
some significant cultural context and political purpose:  
. . . the solution is to look for formations of texts rather than "the text" as 
a place to begin analysis. [. . .] I think we can reconcile traditional modes 
of analysis with the so-called post-modern condition by understanding 
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that our first job as professional consumers of discourse is inventing a 
text suitable for criticism.  
Where rhetorical criticism traditionally seeks to explain the relationship between 
a specific and a hypothetical reader, McGee argues that criticism is the work of a 
specific, politically invested writer who engages in disciplined re-appropriation 
of various fragments into a new text that clarifies how specific works fit into a 
political context. This postmodern approach can be understood as a refinement 
of McGee’s earlier call for rhetorical criticism to concern itself with the recovery 
of “ideographs,” patterns of language use (like “liberty” or “justice,” for example) 
that define an ideological position (1980). Rhetoricians have described Laclau’s 
and Mouffe’s understanding of language and politics in ways that make their 
theory very similar to McGee’s project. Sharon Crowly’s Toward a Civic 
Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentalism, for example, uses Laclau and Mouffe 
to perform criticism that is very much like McGee’s ideographic program. 
Conversely, James Jasinski stresses, in his discussion of ideographic criticism, 
the importance of “articulation,” in which an “ideograph [is] subtly modified as 
the ideograph [is] extended to a new topic” (310).  Celeste Condit and John 
Lucaites similarly stress that ideographs are “totally arbitrary and absolutely 
polysemous,” and might therefore be articulated to lots of contexts (xiii). 
Even though articulation theory has much in common with ideographic 
criticism (and has sometimes been almost interchangeable with it), my approach 
to criticism points toward a method that is quite different from the aggressively 
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intertextual approach that McGee advocates. I do not have any particular 
objection to patching together objects of study by looking for important patterns 
of language use, particularly because of the expanded affordances that this kind 
of analysis allows (and some of these affordances have yet to be fully explored), 
but ideographic criticism pulls the critic away from engaging the complexity of 
specific artifacts. I am not looking to trace the usages of particular language that 
binds social conservatism together; I am trying to understand how a strategy 
used in a particular set of influential texts functions. Micheal Leff argues that 
“The text itself defines the horizon of critical attention. Nothing pushes the critic 
across intertextual space in the effort to locate and assess the movement of 
rhetorical strategies and themes” (228). Leff’s argument is that criticism always 
involves close attention to specific works, and that this kind of attention can 
push one toward considering historical context. Leff’s description of the 
relationship between criticism and history perfectly describes my intentions. 
One of the challenges of studying James Dobson is that he has been a 
remarkably prolific rhetor. In addition to hosting a daily radio show and penning 
regular newsletters for Focus on the Family for thirty years, he has maintained a 
busy public speaking schedule and written over two dozen books, some of which 
have been revised into multiple editions. My goal in selecting artifacts for study 
was to pick texts that stick out from the constant stream of writing that Dobson 
has produced because they represent particularly important moments in 
Dobson’s career. Michael Leff and Andrew Sachs might call these “touchstone” 
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texts, because they represent “potentialities realized only through their 
enactment in discourse” (270). The texts analyzed here are moments that helped 
Dobson to define himself as a public figure. One such text is the seminal Dare to 
Discipline (1970). Another is The Strong Willed Child (1978), an unofficial 
sequel to Dare to Discipline that was published just as Focus on the Family 
began. These two books are important moments in Dobson’s transition from 
practicing psychologist to public figure. Both books have been through multiple 
reprints and revisions, and they remain a part of the core of Dobson’s legacy.  
In addition to these parenting books written while Dobson was still a 
practicing therapist establishing himself as a public figure, I am interested in 
artifacts in which Dobson participated in more direct political engagement. 
Three particularly noteworthy examples of that kind of engagement were the 
letter that Dobson wrote to accompany the Meese Commission report about 
pornography (1986), a jeremiad-like argument against the Clinton 
administration’s proposed changes in stem cell research policy (1993), and an 
open letter warning about the dangers that Barack Obama posed to the country if 
elected (2008). 
Through analysis of this corpus I will be able to talk about the strategies 
Dobson used to claim an agentive position from which he could participate in 
public debate. These texts represent important moments in the career of an 
important rhetor, and they merit the kind of sustained attention that seeks to 
produce criticism that, to use Stanley Fish’s phase, “slow[s]down” the experience 
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of reading so that we can better understand how important texts work (qtd. in 
Jasinski 93). 
The Structure of the dissertation 
 One of the biggest challenges of using interdiscursivity as a frame for 
concept oriented criticism is that it could potentially result in analysis that is 
scattered or superficial. If my analysis merely points out the different discourses 
present in Dobson’s work and claims that the presence of those discourses gives 
Dobson ethos, I will have failed to make my case. I have to explain which 
discourses Dobson uses, I have to describe how he positions himself within those 
discourses, and I have to describe how he reconciles them with each other. 
Because agentive interdiscursivity provides a frame for untangling intricately 
articulated rhetoric, it affords a method for carrying out the kind of complex 
analysis that articulation theory demands. I have organized my dissertation so 
that each chapter builds on the previous one, beginning with a chapter exploring 
the ways Dobson uses mental health rhetoric, then building on that analysis with 
a chapter that explores how Dobson combines mental health rhetoric with 
religious rhetoric, and finally demonstrating how Dobson uses interdiscursivity 
in different contexts. Also, I have organized my use of artifacts chronologically, 
and so a sketch of the arc of James Dobson’s career emerges at the same time 
that my theoretical concerns are thickened. 
 The next chapter, “Expertise and Uncertainty: James Dobson’s Strange 
Modernism,” is a discussion of how Dobson’s work from the early 70s responds 
to uncertainties in mental health care, and the artifact analyzed is Dare to 
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Discipline. The goal of this chapter is to understand how Dobson initially made 
an impact by making his quarrels with his discipline, particularly his quarrel 
with Benjamin Spock, public. I show not only how Dobson used his authority as 
a pediatric psychologist to acquire ethos, but also how his arguments can be 
understood as a response to contemporaneous predicaments in mental health 
care.  
In order to do this job, I need to address a gap in American rhetoric. At 
present, although there is a lot of good work that might be understood as a part 
of a “rhetoric of mental health care” project, an agenda for this project has yet to 
be defined. I understand “the rhetoric of mental health care” as an exploration 
between the push and pull between the dominant view that mental health care 
should be a Modern (“Modern” is Bruno Latour’s term, which is explicated in the 
chapter), biologically oriented medical practice and the view that mental health 
care is fundamentally a culturally situated interpersonal practice. Mental health 
care is not homogenous, and many mental health care disciplines (including the 
branches of applied psychology that are most important to Christian mental 
health care) are invested in socially oriented, rather than biomedical, concepts of 
research and practice, but scholars have argued that since the shift toward 
medicalization that led to the publication of the DSM-III in 1980, the biomedical 
has been the perspective to which mental health care must respond 
(Berkenkotter 2008, McCarthy and Gerring 1980). The conditions that led to 
this shift are an important context for James Dobson’s contemporaneous work 
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as a public expert, particularly in the way that Dobson uses behaviorism to talk 
about parenting and social order. 
 Following my consideration of James Dobson’s use of mental health 
rhetoric is Chapter III, “Expertise and Evangelicalism: James Dobson’s 
Construction of Sacred Space,” an exploration of Dobson’s use of religious 
rhetoric. Religious rhetoric can be identified by its use of strategies that 
somehow set apart a sacred space from which a rhetor can claim higher moral 
authority.  This concept of religious rhetoric is drawn from Kenneth Burke’s 
description of religious language in The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in 
Logology, from work about Kairos and sacred space by Dale Sullivan and 
Richard Crosby, and from Robert Reid’s, Jeffery Bullock’s, and David Fleer’s 
concept of experience oriented homiletic. This chapter includes more analysis of 
Dare to Discipline, and it includes analysis of passages from The Strong Willed 
Child (1978). The Strong Willed Child is a particularly significant book in 
Dobson’s career both because it is something of a sequel to Dare to Discipline 
and because it was published just as Dobson left his career as psychologist and 
began Focus on the Family. In addition to exploring another layer of the 
interdiscursivity that defines Dobson’s work, my analysis will hint at Dobson’s 
development as a rhetor around the time he fully made the leap from being a 
famous psychologist to being a professional media figure.  
 My fourth chapter, and the most single-mindedly devoted to the 
rhetorical analysis, is “Interdiscursive Agency and the Public Sphere: James 
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Dobson’s Hegemonic Rhetoric.” Here I discuss Dobson’s later career as a more 
traditional political actor. In this chapter, I expand my discussion of Laclau and 
Mouffe with a brief consideration of the concept of hegemony, and I analyze 
artifacts that show Dobson making more conventionally “political” arguments, 
specifically the letter that accompanied the Meese Commission report about 
pornography (1986), Dobson’s jeremiad-like argument against the Clinton 
administration’s proposed changes in stem cell research policy (1993), and 
Dobson’s apocalyptic warning about the dangers that Barack Obama posed to 
the country if elected (2008).  Through this analysis, I demonstrate how the 
strategies Dobson invented as a parenting expert were useful for more overtly 
polemic work. In some ways, this chapter is the payoff for the preceding 
chapters, not only because my analysis talks about Dobson’s overall strategy, but 
also because this chapter shows this strategy “in action” in specific debates.   
My conclusion, “Looking Forward: Expertise and Evangelical Mental 
Health Care,” is an acknowledgment of some of important issues in rhetoric that 
my project conjures but does not explore. Because my dissertation examines how 
Dobson used his professional expertise as a public actor and how Dobson helped 
to inspire a politicized industry of Evangelical mental health professionals, it 
suggests very big questions about relationships between expertise, politics, and 
rhetoric.  Dobson’s career is based on his knowledge as a therapist and 
researcher, but some of the claims that Dobson and Focus on the Family make, 
particularly about gender and sexuality, are out of the mainstream. This issue is 
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particularly important as Dobson’s legacy is strongly felt in many contemporary 
debates. Dobsonian rhetoric presents us with difficult questions about legitimacy 
and epistemological boundaries that are important in contemporary democratic 
life. In the work that I have so far done about Dobson, I have largely ignored, or 
relegated to the margins, my concerns about the validity of some of the 
arguments Dobson has made, but the issue looms large.  In “Looking Forward: 
Expertise and Evangelical Mental Health Care,” I propose an expansion of my 
project that would confront questions about the practices of conservative 
Christian therapists. In an effort to begin to lay the groundwork for this project, 
this concluding chapter includes a discussion of the range of what we might 
include in a study of Evangelical mental health care.  
My conclusion suggests starting points for better defining the massive 
project that James Dobson helped to pioneer. Evangelical mental health is an 
important and complex set of practices, and it deserves serious attention from 
scholars interested in expertise, politics, or religion. This dissertation is designed 
to be a starting point for a much larger scholarly endeavor, and so it concludes 
with an eye toward future investigation. Even though Dobson’s work is a rich 
site, it barely begins to deal with either the complexities or the scope of 
Evangelical mental health care. 
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CHAPTER II  
EXPERTISE AND UNCERTAINTY 
James Dobson’s Strange Modernism 
 
 As my first chapter explains, James Dobson’s contribution to 
contemporary American conservatism was to provide both a theoretical and 
infrastructural foundation for politicizing the family, and he was an important, if 
indirect at first, participant in the social conservative project. Dobson was hardly 
the first rhetor to connect the family to public controversy, but he was a pioneer 
in that he articulated what was seen by many as the social chaos of the late 
sixties to “liberal” attitudes about early childhood development. For Dobson, the 
violence of the sixties was not born of legitimate anger at social inequality, 
authoritarianism, or war; it was, instead, an outbreak of chaos caused by mid-
century social experiments, particularly the progressive parenting advocated by 
Benjamin Spock. Dare to Discipline (1970) was the book where Dobson first 
used his authority as a pediatric expert to participate in the conservative project, 
and it is the foundation for his career as a political agent.  
 Because the political arguments in Dare to Discipline depend upon James 
Dobson’s authority as a psychologist, they present the rhetorician with a difficult 
problem. Political rhetoric, according to Laclau and Mouffe, involves complex 
articulations between different ways of knowing. The agentive interdiscursivity 
that enabled Dobson’s success depends heavily on his authority as an expert 
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about parenting, and so a description of Dobson’s work must take into account 
the ways in which Dobson’s rhetoric is rooted in his credentials as a psychologist. 
In order to proceed with a discussion about Dobson’s use of arguments drawn 
from his work as a researcher and therapist, I must deal with an important 
question about mental health care: what are the cultural circumstances of 
mental health care, and how do they allow for mental health rhetoric to be 
appropriated for political purposes?  
 Bruno Latour’s concept of “Modernism,” because it directly addresses 
some of the epistemological tensions inherent of problems of the mind (which 
are sometimes embodied in disciplinary conflicts between mental health 
professionals), is a particularly useful starting point for rhetoricians attempting 
to explore mental health care. Latour defines “Modernism” as the rhetorical 
separation of the material, the discursive, and the social. In the case of mental 
health care, “Modernism” can be felt in the influence of biomedical psychiatry, 
which, during the past four decades, has become an increasingly important part 
of how professionals who do mental health research or therapy define their 
work. Biomedical psychiatry seeks to transform mental health care into 
something like physical medicine, as opposed to understanding it as an 
interpersonal social practice. Not every mental health care discipline has become 
medical; instead, the push to define mental health along Modernist lines, along 
with the backlash against this trend, provides a useful starting point for the 
rhetorician to culturally locate mental health care. Paying attention to the 
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assumptions of Modernism affords us a way to examine how James Dobson’s 
arguments about parenting respond to some of the shifts in mental health care 
taking place during the seventies. 
 The chapter begins with a demonstration how Dare to Discipline makes 
broad, interdiscursive arguments out of Dobson’s professional claims about 
parenting. Then it includes an explication of what a non-Modern view of mental 
health care (“non-Modern” simply refers to investigation of the mechanisms that 
produce Modernism and their effects), and then it includes an analysis of Dare 
to Discipline that discusses how Dobson’s arguments respond to the tensions 
that underpin mental health care. It concludes with a brief discussion of 
articulation theory that looks forward to my third chapter, “Expertise and 
Evangelicalism: James Dobson’s Construction of Sacred Space,” which describes 
how Dobson connected his stance as a psychologist to the authority of religion. 
Dare to Discipline and agentive interdiscursivity 
 James Dobson’s public career can be described in terms of its wide 
ranging importance. Not only did he help pioneer what became a huge mental 
health care project; he also founded an Evangelical media empire, served in 
several important positions for the Reagan administration, and became an 
occasionally prominent participant in policy debates. This diverse career began 
with the publication of Dare to Discipline in 1970, and in it we can see the 
origins of Dobson’s multifaceted life’s work. Not only was Dare to Discipline a 
pioneering text in its focus on parenting as a political issue for conservatives to 
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be concerned about; it was the text in which the interdiscursivity that enabled 
Dobson’s prominence first appeared. The following is a frequently cited passage 
from the introduction to Dare to Discipline:  
Children thrive best in an atmosphere of genuine love, undergirded by 
reasonable, consistent discipline. In a day of widespread drug usage, 
immorality, civil disobedience, vandalism, and violence, we must not 
depend on hope and luck to fashion the critical attitudes we value in our 
children. That unstructured technique was applied during the childhood 
of the generation which is now in college, and the outcome has been quite 
discouraging. Permissiveness has not just been a failure; it's been a 
disaster! (13-14) 
Dobson’s rhetorical war against “permissiveness” is both an argument by an 
expert against a specific school of parenting (or perhaps a popular version of it or 
even a strawman of it), and an attack on the values of the Left. In the catalogue 
of social ills Dobson presents (“widespread drug usage, immorality, civil 
disobedience, vandalism, and violence”), “permissive” parenting is linked to 
social protest, which is linked to petty criminality, substance abuse, and 
meaningless violence. Dobson’s primary purpose is to compare different 
parenting strategies, but he articulates this professional advice so broadly that a 
passage about his differences over pediatric psychology with Benjamin Spock 
becomes a jeremiad-like indictment of an entire generation. (At this point in my 
analysis, I will refrain from discussing the “jeremiadic” nature of Dobson’s 
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argument, but Dobson’s suggestion of religion is important, and I will discuss his 
use of religious rhetoric in my next chapter.) 
  I will present a fuller description of Dobson’s interdiscursive strategy in 
chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, but as a first step, I need to discuss 
Dobson’s use of mental health rhetoric. Dobson’s authority as a pediatric 
psychologist is the foundation of his public persona, and, in fact, he still presents 
himself as “Dr. James Dobson,” even though he abandoned his work as a 
psychologist decades ago.6 Dobson’s pioneering work as a parenting expert in 
the 1970s can be understood as a response to the larger cultural tensions 
surrounding mental health care, and historically, his arguments about 
uncertainties in his field mirror the concerns that led to the drafting of DSM-III. 
Dare to Discipline is, after all, nominally a book about child care, and the bulk of 
Dare to Discipline is very specific advice about parenting delivered by an expert. 
(There are long explanations of the appropriate ways to use parenting tools like 
allowances, chores, and punishment, for example.) In order to examine it as a 
rhetorical artifact, then, I need first to establish grounds for a rhetorician to 
discuss the cultural circumstances that surround mental health care.  
A non-Modern approach to the rhetoric of mental health care 
Dare to Discipline appears at first to present a problematic boundary 
between the “inside” and “outside” of scientific expertise in a context that is 
occasionally marked by an oppositional ideology.  Psychology does not construct 
the family according to the same rules as does Evangelical Christianity or 
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conservatism, and while all three share the goal of promoting stable, flourishing 
families, they have different epistemological assumptions and different cultural 
allegiances.7  Dobson’s rhetoric, which transforms arguments about pediatric 
psychology into political speech, might be understood as a site where we can 
examine a rich commensurability problem. A science-based way of 
understanding the family is in contact with, and presumably sometimes in 
conflict with, a particular set of religious beliefs and a political agenda. As I 
discussed in my introductory chapter, Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
incommensurability is a necessary part of political rhetoric; a rhetorical strategy 
capable of enrolling people into a worldview functions by disarticulating and 
rearticulating different ideas from different contexts. However, articulation 
theory presents a problem for rhetoric that uses science, since it means that 
language taken from science is being used in way that seems to damage, or at 
least to disregard, the integrity of a scientific discipline, as the acknowledged 
limitations that afford science credibility are disregarded.8 
One of the problems with framing Dare to Discipline (along with, 
presumably, other popular books written by mental health professionals) as a 
commensurability problem is that it suggests that science exists outside of 
economic, institutional, and linguistic contexts– that it is a culture of no culture. 
Bruno Latour writes, “For the epistemologist the scientific disciplines have to 
become solid and reliable without being connected through any sort of vessels to 
the rest of their world. The heart will be required to pump in and out, but there 
31 
 
 
will be no output, no body, no lungs, and no vascular system” (109). Bruno 
Latour calls the culture/nature/language divisions that define post-
enlightenment thought “the Modern Constitution,” and he argues that these 
separations authorize science (We Have Never Been Modern 11). Donna 
Haraway similarly uses the metaphor of type O blood to describe science: just as 
blood without certain antigens can be taken from one person and given to 
another, science without culture can travel “into many kinds of bodies” (218).   
  Interrogating the post enlightenment perspectives that empower science, 
particularly the assumptions of positivist epistemology in scientific and 
technological culture, has been an important project for rhetoricians. (For 
example, Carolyn Miller’s seminal 1981 article, “A Humanistic Rational for 
Technical Writing,” frames professional communication as a response to 
positivism, and Stephen Toulmin’s Cosmopolis is an extended meditation on 
post enlightenment thought and rhetoric.) Carl Herndl’s contribution to this 
discussion has been to align rhetoric explicitly with Bruno Latour’s “Non-
Modern” (as opposed to “anti-modern”) sociological project. Latour argues that 
an anthropological methodology allows us to recover a kind of realism by 
describing science as networks of activity. Of particular interest to rhetoric is 
Latour’s focus on the centrality of writing in the scientific process. In Laboratory 
Life, an ethnographic account of scientists working at the Salk Institute, Latour 
says that scientists are a “strange tribe” of “compulsive and manic writers . . . 
who spend the greatest part of their day coding, marking, altering, correcting, 
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reading, and writing” (48-49). Herndl argues that because discourse is central to 
the paradoxical purification and extension of impure (mixtures of material, 
discursive, and cultural) networks that define scientific culture, rhetoricians are 
particularly well equipped to explore these processes: “rhetoric articulates and 
rearticulates networks building broader, more extended networks by enrolling 
actants from the material, the discursive and the real” (230-231). Non-
Modernism asks rhetoricians to look at science not as epistemology, but as an 
enterprise of connecting people and things into networks of activity. This 
enrollment depends heavily upon rhetoric not only because texts form many of 
the linkages in the networks of activity that constitute science (notes, records, 
journals, meetings), but also because discursively constructed neutral materiality 
offers science an authority that allows it to perpetuate itself.  
Non-Modernism is meant to describe any kind of scientific enterprise, but 
it is particularly useful for framing a discussion of mental health care, an 
uncertainty fraught project that includes a wide spectrum of approaches to both 
therapy and research, in part because it is a project that has a particularly 
difficult relationship with Modern culture. Human psychology and its difficulties 
sprawl across the nature/culture/language divisions that define Modernism. 
Depending on the orientation and specialty of a particular therapist, mental 
health care could be either/both a medical practice or/and an interpersonal 
practice. Add to this confusion the fact that therapists sometimes practice in 
absentia by using popular media (public health pamphlets, self-help or advice 
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books, television or radio appearances, websites, etc.), and one can see that 
mental health care has a particularly strange relationship with Modernist 
science. Not only does mental health care exist in diverse professional and social 
contexts, but those contexts construct the topic in different, sometimes even 
opposing, ways. Depression is not the same kind of problem for a bio-medically 
oriented psychiatrist as it is for a pastor with a counseling certification, even 
though both may use the same diagnostic criteria and recommend some of the 
same treatments.   
Choosing mental health care’s relationship to Modernism as a way to 
center my own interrogation has two advantages. First of all, this strategy allows 
me to build upon already existing rhetorical scholarship about mental health. 
Psychiatry has been thus far the discipline most often chosen for study among 
humanities scholars.9 Secondly, and more importantly, this approach usefully 
frames a dominant trend in mental health care during the past few decades: the 
attempt to align mental health care with the material part of Latour’s Modern 
Constitution. Medical humanities scholar Kevin Aho writes that contemporary 
mental health care has become preoccupied with “breaking down and classifying 
all of the various diseases of the brain and nervous system; identifying criteria 
that allow the psychiatrist to diagnose the proper disease; and prescribing 
psychotropic drugs and/or short-term cognitive-behavioral therapies” (246). 
One of the side effects of our increasingly biomedical understanding of mental 
illness is a tendency for psychiatry to extend its diagnostic apparatus deeper and 
34 
 
 
deeper into everyday human behavior. Psychiatrist Paul Chodoff writes that 
“some American psychiatrists, in their eagerness to include all varieties and 
vagaries of human feelings and behavior in their professional domain, are 
running the risk of trying to medicalize not only psychiatry but the human 
condition itself.” The trend toward biomedical diagnostic works exactly as 
Latour’s theory of Modernity predicts; the practical and rhetorical construction 
of culture-free materialism allows for networks of practice to extend themselves 
further and further across different social contexts.   
Lucille Parkinson McCarthy and Joan Page Gerring argue that the DSM-
III, published in 1980, was a “charter” document designed to transform mental 
health care into a “high status profession built upon investigatory science rather 
than a heterodox set of practices with no secure theoretical and empirical 
knowledge base” (158). Even though biomedical psychiatry is a push toward 
data-driven, culturally neutral diagnosis that uses evolutionary description, 
psychiatric diagnosis will never have the same kind of straightforward validity 
that physically oriented medicine does. To offer an example of the relative 
authority that medicine has, Scott Graham’s “Agency and the Rhetoric of 
Medicine: Biomedical Brain Scans and the Ontology of Fibromyalgia,” describes 
the effort to construct a disease through the grounding of that disease in the 
physical. Fibromyalgia, a pain disorder with an unknown etiology, became a 
“real” disease when scientists could take pictures of it, even if the brain scans 
that showed patterns of pain were only representations of symptoms. Its 
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“reality” was solidified when it could be treated with a chemical: “Lyrica 
approval functioned not only as a policy statement but also as an ontological 
pronouncement—i.e., it enfranchised the reality of FM” (376). Even though the 
means to construct Fibromyalgia as a physical problem were indirect, the fact 
that it could be constructed as one meant that it was “real.” Mental health care, 
even though it tries to imitate physical medicine with biological description and 
psychopharmacological treatment, exists in a much slipperier place.  
 Richard Vatz’s and Lee Weinberg’s “The Rhetorical Paradigm of Mental 
Illness: Thomas Szasz and the Myth of Mental Illness” goes so far as to implicitly 
question whether or not psychiatric diagnoses are not entirely cultural, political 
phenomena. Thomas Szasz argues that mental illnesses are constructions that 
serve as mechanisms for enforcing social norms, and he argues that psychiatry 
had adopted a “medical” ethos as a means of establishing credibility for what was 
a rhetorical way of categorizing behavior: “For Szasz. . . the alleged 
medical/scientific discovery of such ‘problems’ amounts to no more than the 
rhetorical creation of problems through strategic defining. . . (314).’” Vatz and 
Weinberg argue that the trend toward biomedicine that consumed psychiatry 
was a strategic “attempt at proof or authentication” (319).10 
 This trend toward the biomedical does not, of course, define all mental 
health care (in fact, one of mental health care’s defining features is plurality), 
and it has hardly gone unnoticed. The recent history of mental health care is 
filled with explicit and sometimes bitter public debates between those who 
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advocate a biomedical, evolutionary perspective and those who advocate an 
interpersonal, discursive perspective. Significantly, the skeptical views of the 
ontological status of mental health care discussed above are not wholly 
dissimilar from the view that many insiders, like the aforementioned psychiatrist 
Paul Chodoff, have.  The ongoing work being done to draft the DSM-V, for 
example, has provoked statements of protest from professional organizations 
and petitions with thousands of signatures from therapists (Waters). Carol 
Bernstein, the past president of the American Psychiatric Association who 
helped to initiate the creation of the DSM-V, explains that the categories of the 
various editions of the DSM are “useful placeholders, based on careful 
descriptions, but not on deeper understandings,” and while the DSM has been a 
useful tool for guiding research and standardizing the kinds of diagnosis that are 
appropriate for therapists to make, “That very success . . . has given rise to a 
serious unintended consequence: DSM diagnoses have come, over the last four 
decades, to be treated as "real entities" in the world, that is, they have been 
reified.” 
Even though many who participate in the wide spectrum of disciplined 
practices that we might label “mental health care” reject the biomedical, it is the 
hegemony to which they have to respond. Hegemony, after all, is not 
monoculture. Many mental health care disciplines are invested in socially 
oriented, rather than biomedical, concepts of research and practice. T.M. 
Lurhmann’s Of Two Minds, an ethnographic account of contemporary training 
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in psychiatry, writes that biomedical psychiatry is compelling because it is 
tangible: “. . .in the world of rationalized and rationed medicine, . . . claims [for 
the efficacy of psychodynamic, socially oriented mental health care] seem 
unbearably ambiguous. They provide no guidelines to anyone about the length of 
adequate trial of therapy, about its type, or about who should deliver it” (207). 
Carol Berkenkotter’s study of narrative in psychiatry notes that psychodynamic 
interaction and storytelling are central both to the history of mental health care 
and to its current practice, but increasingly, legitimacy has been defined 
according to data driven, biomedical standards: “The effect of the DSM-III . . . 
was to codify the classifications of psychopathology and to mandate therapists’ 
use of a nomothetic nomenclature, despite many therapists’ insistence on the 
idiographic and interpersonal nature of their clients’ problems” (160).   
Dare to Discipline was published during the period when mental health 
care was evolving toward the biomedical, and the Modernist tensions 
surrounding mental health care are an important, and overlooked, context for 
the arguments that Dobson makes. McCArthy and Gerring argue that from the 
mid-sixties to the early eighties psychiatrists who subscribed to Emil Kraepelin’s 
theory that mental health care should be a medical practice concerned with 
treating well defined illness mounted a campaign to establish a new consensus in 
mental health care: “the sheer number of pieces sharing the neo-Kraepelinian 
orientation forced mental health researchers to acknowledge the importance of 
the biomedical model” (158, 160). While James Dobson’s response to 
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uncertainty in mental health care was very different one from those of the neo-
Kraepelinians whose work established the foundations of biomedical psychiatry, 
we can understand his pioneering early work as being a part of the same 
conversation,  particularly because Dobson so emphatically grounds his 
arguments in behaviorism and biology.  
Dare to Discipline’s Modernist vision  
 While biomedical psychiatry was attempting to rearticulate the disarrayed 
disciplines concerned with mental health care, James Dobson was building his 
career as a public figure. Of course, Dobson, a psychologist who was concerned 
about parenting, had a very different agenda than psychiatrists who were trying 
to standardize diagnoses according to a medical ideology, and his arguments do 
not perfectly parallel those that lead to the emergence of biomedical psychiatry. 
The following passage from Dare to Discipline is Dobson’s survey of the disorder 
in his discipline: 
The American public has been subjected to many wildhorse opinions 
about child discipline, which have galloped off rapidly in all directions. 
Everyone. . . has his  own unique viewpoint about how children should be 
controlled, and what is worse, the experts have often been in direct 
contradiction with one another. The cause of their disagreement is 
simple: the principles of good discipline cannot be ascertained by 
scientific inquiry. [. . .] Despite the disagreement in the past, I am 
thoroughly convinced that the proper control of children can be found in 
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reasonable, commonsense philosophy, were five key elements are 
paramount. (25) 
Dobson’s claim that “scientific inquiry” (presumably quantitative, controlled 
research) cannot address parenting initially suggests that we see him as being 
radically divergent from the neo-Kraepelinian movement in psychiatry, but this 
passage echoes it in important ways. While Dobson defends the validity of 
psychology as a professional field, his purpose is to lament that expert opinion is 
scattered “in all directions,” and even though he does not go so far as to declare 
other perspectives invalid, he claims that he is putting to rest the disorder 
through a more logical ideology.  
 Both Dobson and contemporaneous advocates of biomedical psychiatry 
were motivated by concern with the muddle of mental health care research and 
practice, and both preferred to ground their arguments in biological causality. 
For biomedical psychiatrists, this meant an advocacy of quantitative research 
about diagnosis based on evolutionary theory and symptom oriented treatment. 
For Dobson, this meant an advocacy of experience-based arguments for cause-
and-effect behaviorism. Dobson writes in his introduction: 
The recommendations in this book are not experimental or speculative. [.  
. . ] They are not based on abstruse theoretical assumptions, but rather on 
practical consequences. As Jack London has stated, “the best 
measurement of anything should be: does it work?” (14) 
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While Dobson refuses to call for quantitative research, he is interested in a kind 
of empiricism: that of practical experience. The reference to naturalist Jack 
London is a preview of Dobson’s approach to psychology; his answers to 
questions about childhood development are drawn from behaviorism. Dobson 
believes that children need to be “trained” in certain ways to accept and 
internalize authority. In important ways, this model resembles Freudianism, 
with a politically conservative slant and a biologically specific twist. The 
superego, for Dobson, is constructed not from social pressure, but from proper 
training. In his chapter describing specific parenting techniques, “The Miracle 
Tools,” he begins with a long story about teaching tricks to his dog Siggy (named 
after Freud) using cookies as rewards:  
This reinforcement technique was useful in teaching Siggy to go chase a 
ball . . . . [. . .] More serious attempts have been made to teach 
sophisticated behavior to animals by the principles of reinforcement, and 
the results have been remarkable. (64-65)  
He goes on to describe different principles of Skinnerian reinforcement as it 
might apply to parenting. He often includes maxims derived from behaviorism, 
such as “any behavior which is learned through reinforcement can be eliminated 
if the reward is withheld long enough” and “parents and teacher are also 
vulnerable to reinforcement” (78, 88). 
Dobson uses this naturalist frame not to only to discuss narrow issues 
about the psychology of parenting, but also to talk about broad social concerns. 
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He begins the first chapter of the book with a biological analogy describing the 
dangers of drug use and sexual freedom. He is arguing in this passage that 
because society has slowly changed into a more liberal place, we are unable to 
recognize the dangers of permissiveness. He begins by setting up his story as a 
description of scientific realism: “Nature has generously equipped most animals 
with a fear of things that could be harmful to them. Their survival depends on 
recognition of a particular danger in time to avoid it” (15). He quickly shifts into 
a more colloquial voice and offers an example:  
But good old Mother Nature did not protect the frog quite so well; she 
overlooked a serious flaw in his early warning system that sometimes 
proves fatal. If a frog is placed in a pan of warm water under which the 
heat is being  increased very gradually, he will typically show no 
inclination to escape. [. . .] He will just sit there, contentedly peering over 
the edge of the pan while the steam curls ominously around his nostrils. 
Eventually, the boiling frog will pass on to his reward, having succumbed 
to an unnecessary misfortune that he could easily have avoided. (15) 
Dobson admits that he has moved from a naturalist description of biology 
(explaining that fear is a survival mechanism) to using frogs as a metaphor, but 
he does so without abandoning his “naturalist” grounding:  
Now obviously, this is a book about parents and children, not frogs. But 
human beings have some of the same perceptual inadequacies as their 
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little green friends. We have passively accepted a slowly deteriorating 
youth scene without uttering a croak of protest” (16).   
This move is particularly rich, as it admits to the extravagance of Dobson’s 
allegory (the cultural changes of the 60s and 70s were like a frog being slowly 
boiled alive!?) while holding onto the authority of expertise. He argues that we 
cannot assess our degraded state because we suffer from “perceptual 
inadequacies” that are cognitively similar to an animal in an unnatural situation 
for which its warning mechanisms are ill-equipped.   
 Here we see how Dobson articulates his responses to his discipline to 
other discourses. This passage is at once a simple fable that espouses common 
sense through a tall tale-like colloquial story (that he did not invent), an expert’s 
explanation of cognitive phenomenon, and a blistering assessment of 
contemporary America. The frog serves as an accessible story, but also a rather 
grim example. It is not that Dobson has a difference of opinion; it is that we are 
being boiled alive and do not know it. A naturalist argument that people become 
acclimated to their environments is articulated to a warning that our cultural 
norms have become dangerous.  Again, we see ordinary common sense and 
expert opinion intertwined. 
 One of the key paradoxes of Dare to Discipline is that Dobson creates 
identification with his audience by positioning himself against the elite opinions 
of the mental health establishment. Dobson begins the book with a horror story 
of an unruly, intolerable child and an ineffectual mother shackled to the 
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“unworkable” and “permissive” philosophy of child care that foregoes the use of 
discipline:  
Mrs. Nichols and her little daughter are among the many casualties of an 
unworkable, illogical philosophy of child management which has 
dominated the literature on this subject during the past twenty years. This 
mother had read that a child will eventually respond to patience and 
tolerance, ruling out the need for discipline.” (11-12)  
The persona Dobson adopts here is that of an expert-- he is qualified to comment 
that a school of parenting that has “dominated the literature . . . during the last 
twenty years” is “illogical.” As the passage continues, Dobson’s complaint 
implicitly transforms from being a strictly professional opinion into being a 
commonsense observation and moral judgment: 
She has been taught that conflicts between parent and child were to be 
perceived as inevitable misunderstandings or differences in viewpoint. 
Unfortunately, Mrs. Nichols and her advisors were wrong! She and her 
child were involved in no simple difference of opinion; she was being 
challenged, mocked, and defied by her daughter. (12) 
Dobson characterizes progressive “permissive” parenting as being an acceptance 
of a peer relationship between a child and an adult, and he argues that the 
unruly child is not just being disruptive, but actively challenging the social order. 
Dobson concludes the anecdote with a reiteration of this grim take on the 
situation: “the real issue was totally unrelated to the water or the nap or other 
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aspects of the particular circumstances. The actual meaning behind this conflict 
and a hundred others was simply this: Sandy was brazenly rejecting the 
authority of her mother” (12).  
 Dobson’s argument is that the faddish trends in mainstream pediatric 
psychology (or at least, he makes an “expert” claims about these trends) should 
be done away with and replaced by a school of parenting that conforms to a 
commonsensical behaviorist cause-and-effect model. This is a rich stance that, 
curiously, allows him to make a naturalist argument authorized by expertise that 
is also a populist, anti-elite argument. Dobson is not only an expert; he is a wise 
expert, capable of critiquing mainstream mental health care through the 
common sense of the superior moral grounding of the everyday social order. 
Parents and children cannot be peers or society will fall apart. The reader is 
invited not only to consider Dobson’s practical advice, but to take comfort in the 
acceptable common sense and moral certainty to which it is articulated.  Dobson 
writes, “I reject [laissez-faire parenting] and I have considerable evidence to 
refute it” (13). This rhetoric divides the practical, ethical, morally grounded “we” 
from an aloof elite who would risk families and societies for their ideological 
commitment to permissiveness. 
 The various contexts that Dobson has put his argument in include 
professional judgment, common sense, timeless moral law, and social critique, 
and this interdiscursive strategy invites the audience to share not just Dobson’s 
narrow opinions about techniques of raising a child, but an overarching 
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worldview. Dobson’s argument is both “my professional opinions cut through 
the muddle of the mental health care establishment and you should listen to me” 
and “your moral responsibility is to establish a social order and quell dissent.” 
The strangely hostile language Dobson uses to describe children makes sense 
only when we see his arguments in the light of the political and moral contexts in 
which he places them. Dobson writes, in one of the most famous and 
controversial passages from the book: 
When a youngster tries this kind of stiff-necked rebellion, you had better 
take it  out of him, and pain is a marvelous purifier [. . .]. You have drawn 
a line in the dirt, and the child has deliberately flopped his big hairy toe 
across it. Who is going to win? Who has the most courage? Who is in 
charge here? (27) 
Dobson’s style here might be read as a challenge to the “permissive” school of 
parenting or as an effort to steel the noncommittal parent for her (Dobson uses 
feminine pronouns and mothers as his representative weak parents) 
responsibilities, but the evocation of “hairy” rebellion is an almost overt 
evocation of the sixties counterculture.  This strange language choice (hairy toes 
on a toddler?) is also suggestive of threatening un-subdued wildness. The child 
threatens to become a dissident hippy or a demonic beast. Dobson argues that if 
rebellion is not quelled at the earliest possible stage in a child’s development 
schism and disorder are inevitable: 
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A controlling but patient hand will eventually succeed in settling the little 
tyrant, but probably not until he is about four years of age. Unfortunately, 
however, the  child's attitude toward authority can be severely damaged 
during his toddler years. The parent who loves her cute little butterball so 
much that she cannot risk antagonizing him, may lose and never regain 
his control [. . .] The proper time to begin disarming the teen-age time-
bomb is twelve years before it arrives. Perhaps the most difficult problems 
referred to me occur with the rebellious, hostile teen-ager for whom the 
parents have done everything wrong since he was born. [. . .]  For a 
psychologist, this problem must be approached as a physician views 
terminal cancer: "I can't cure it now; it's too late. Perhaps I can make its 
consequences less painful." (33-34) 
Dobson ends this narrative that connects disciplining small children to juvenile 
delinquency to moral chaos with a medical analogy. Even though he has gone to 
the trouble of transforming his professional judgments into common sense and 
then into large scale social commentary, he resolves the incongruities of the 
political and social conflicts he is using to frame his warnings about disciplining 
toddlers by steering the audience back into a biologically oriented therapeutic 
context. Dobson frames his argument with appeals to conservative prudence, 
appeals to timeless wisdom, invocations of moral panic, and appeals to a 
“commonsense” distrust of elitist, faddish science, but ultimately, Dobon’s 
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argument is held together by his ethos as a psychologist and by behaviorist 
arguments about psychology. 
Articulation, paradox, and interdiscursivity 
 Dale Buss writes that “. . .even Dobson agrees that Dare to Discipline was 
far from a literary tour de force.[. . .] The book is actually a somewhat loosely 
packaged collection of essays and snippets of advice whose subjects are mainly 
united by being Dobson’s passions in those days” (45). While I agree with Buss’s 
(and Dobson’s) assessment that the book is a strangely organized outpouring 
with a wildly shifting authorial voice, the book is “united” in ways that are more 
important than he acknowledges. Richard Vatz argues that rhetorical situations 
are defined not through the intrinsic properties of a case, but through rhetorical 
activity: “When political commentators talk about issues they are talking about 
situations made salient, not something that became important because of its 
intrinsic predominance” (160). The work of articulation, according to Laclau and 
Mouffe, is simply the work of “making salient” some aspects of a situation while 
denying others. In Dare to Discipline, Benjamin Spock, violence, and drug abuse 
share a context that excludes, for example, the Vietnam War or the violence 
directed toward the civil rights movement.  
 In his description of articulation theory, Lawrence Grossberg writes: “The 
concept of articulation provides a useful starting point for describing the process 
of forging connections between practices and effects, as well as of enabling 
practices to have different, often unpredicted effects” (54). Behaviorism was not 
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a theory that reified commonsense conservatism until James Dobson recognized 
that it could become one. This new articulation is a surprising one, as 
behaviorism seems to be at odds with the moral agenda of Dare to Discipline. 
Biological theories about human behavior have often found itself odds with the 
religious movement with which Dobson is associated; behaviorism is a theory 
explained by evolution, which James Dobson does not believe happened.  
 One of the curious aspects of Dare to Discipline is that it is 
simultaneously a book that depends on expert authority (and a book that is a 
response to disciplinary problems in psychology), and a populist complaint 
about elitism. Laclau’s “On Populism” (a precedent for Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy) argues that populism is not native to any particular kind of politics, 
but is instead a kind of rhetorical strategy built out of “interpellations and 
contradictions—which constitute the raw material on which class ideological 
practices operate” (161). Populism can be directed toward lots of different 
purposes, and it is deeply entangled in self-contradiction. Dobson uses expertise 
to argue that the social order of tradition is better than expertise.11 Dobon’s 
rhetoric, which uses Modernist rhetoric to argue against the chaos of the present, 
might seem strange, but this kind of idiosyncrasy is how populist strategies 
function. We must ask not only what the political consequences of these 
strategies are, but we must examine how they are constructed.  
 This kind of paradox is not, according to articulation theory, novel. 
Grossberg writes that articulation “often involves delinking or disarticulating 
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connections in order to connect others” (54). Dobson’s work can be understood 
not only as a conservative rant about the dramatic social changes of the 1960s, 
but also as a response to cultural tensions surrounding his discipline, but even as 
Dobson constructs an ethos of expertise, he positions himself as rebel against his 
discipline. The particular contradictions Dobson constructs are not the only way 
that expertise can be used for political purposes, but the paradox of the strange 
figure, the Modernist anti-elitist expert, that Dobson becomes in his writing 
suggests how the serious are the challenges inherent in using expert knowledge 
to find political agency. More immediately, this figure helps us to think about the 
popular conservative rhetoric that has become one of the dominant voices in our 
politics. 
 We can see in James Dobson’s nuanced arguments with his discipline a 
rhetor working to reorient the relationships between politics and science, and 
even if his authorial voice slips from time to time, the possibilities that Dobson 
created with this brilliant performance became very important for public life in 
the United States. I have begun, in this chapter, to suggest the strategies Dobson 
used to connect his opinions about psychology to other discourses, but I have not 
yet explored them in depth. The following chapter, “Expertise and 
Evangelicalism: James Dobson’s Construction of Sacred Space” discusses 
Dobson’s construction of religious rhetoric, and it explores the ways that Dobson 
connects his expert authority to the moral certainty of conservative 
Evangelicalism. I have so far addressed agentive interdiscursivity in terms of 
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Dobson’s articulation of his professional perspective to a broad social agenda. I 
will now complicate matters further by talking about how Dobson defined 
mental health care and religion as a part of the same worldview. 
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CHAPTER III 
 EXPERTISE AND EVANGELISM 
James Dobson’s Construction of Sacred Space 
 
In his discussion of articulation theory and conservatism, Lawrence 
Grossberg argues that the American Right’s success can be attributed not to 
conservatives’ skill at conventional political debate or organizing, but to their 
attention to cultural work. Grossberg argues that discourses that encourage 
cultural affiliation are more important than the campaigning and arguing that 
we conventionally understand to be “political” rhetoric. He writes, “rather than 
attempting to win the minds of the nation, this is a struggle over its heart and 
body. This project works at the intersections of politics, everyday life, and 
popular culture. [. . .] In this contest, culture leads politics” (255).  Grossberg’s 
analysis illuminates how James Dobson, whose work is intimately concerned 
with the everyday business of parenting and marriage rather than with policy 
debate or electoral politics, participates in the shaping of conservative 
partisanship.  
 So far, I have discussed the rhetorical strategies Dobson used to articulate 
his expertise as a psychologist to a populist conservative perspective. Paying 
attention to those strategies allows us to understand how Dobson’s informed 
responses to contemporaneous issues in psychology helped him to participate 
rhetorically in “the intersections of politics, everyday life, and popular culture,” 
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where political work happens. Understanding how Dobson used his expertise as 
a psychologist in his earliest popular work allows us to see the foundations of the 
even more intimate engagement in the life of his audience that he undertook 
through his work with Focus on the Family; by writing about the family Dobson 
became a broadcaster who made daily appearances in the homes of his audience. 
His occasional forays into conventional politics (as opposed to the kind of 
politically important cultural work that articulation theory describes), which 
began in earnest during the Clinton Administration, are a big part of Dobson’s 
legacy as a prominent conservative, but his work as a public psychologist is 
arguably more important. Not only did Dobson help to pioneer a conservative 
Christian mental health care industry and help create evangelical popular 
culture, he also established important new ways for social conservatives to 
speak.  
 Dobson’s expertise as a psychologist is the foundation of his career as a 
prominent rhetor, but there is another important discourse that must be taken 
into account in order to describe how Dobson’s rhetoric functions: religion. 
While religion is an obviously important part of Dobson’s work (not only has 
James Dobson collaborated with other important figures from the Religious 
Right but Focus on the Family is nominally a ministry), it is a difficult topic to 
treat appropriately. First of all, even though Evangelical Christianity is a key 
element in Dobson’s work, Dobson is not primarily a religious rhetor. Religion is, 
instead, a part of the agentive interdiscursivity that defines Dobson’s rhetorical 
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strategy. A responsible analysis of Dobson’s work must seriously explore the 
ways that Dobson uses religion without succumbing to the temptation to define 
him as a polemicist for conservative Evangelicalism. Such a view suggests 
something duplicitous about Dobson’s mental health expert persona; if Dobson’s 
use of mental health rhetoric is compromised by a fundamentalist agenda, then 
he becomes disingenuous charlatan rather than a sophisticated rhetor. Secondly, 
an analysis that seeks to understand Dobson’s use of religious rhetoric must have 
a way to delineate “religious rhetoric” from other kinds of argument. What 
makes a rhetorical strategy “religious”? Is it a use of particular cultural 
signifiers? Is it the use of dogma as a part of an argument?  
 In this chapter, I argue that in order to understand Dobson’s 
interdiscursive use of religion, religious rhetoric should be understood as 
rhetoric that sets aside sacred space from which a rhetor can project moral 
authority, and I explore strategies that Dobson uses to combine religious 
rhetoric with arguments drawn from his expertise as a psychologist. I begin with 
a discussion of the importance of religious rhetoric in Dobson’s work, first by 
responding to approaches other rhetoricians have taken and then by explicating 
my own approach to defining of religious rhetoric as sacred space. Then I 
perform analysis of passages from Dare to Dare to Discipline (1970) and The 
Strong Willed Child (1978). The Strong Willed Child is, in many ways, a sequel 
to Dare to Discipline, both because it contains more developed versions of the 
arguments found in the earlier book, and also because it directly addresses the 
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controversies surrounding it. The Strong Willed Child is an important artifact in 
Dobson’s career because it was published in 1978, the year that Dobson left his 
career as a psychologist to start the Focus on the Family radio show. It therefore 
offers a snapshot of Dobson’s development as a rhetor at an important moment 
in his career. Finally, I return to a discussion of articulation theory that looks 
forward to my fourth chapter, “Interdiscursive Agency and the Public Sphere: 
James Dobson’s Hegemonic Rhetoric.” That chapter, the final in the dissertation 
that includes rhetorical analysis, discusses how Dobson has used combinations 
of expert rhetoric and religious rhetoric in public debate.   
James Dobson and religion  
James Dobson is generally (and appropriately) understood as part of the 
Religious Right, and so we must take seriously the ways that religion informs his 
rhetorical strategies. Even though religion is important to Dobson’s career as a 
public figure, I wish not to argue that Dobson is somehow “really” a religious 
leader working through texts about parenting, but that he articulates the 
authority of religious rhetoric to arguments derived from his experience as a 
psychologist. Even if Dobson’s opinions about parenting and marriage do not 
always reflect contemporary research in psychology (and the distance between 
Dobson and mainstream mental health care has widened over the years), as the 
previous chapter demonstrates, his model of family life is built upon expert 
arguments about psychology. Not only does Dobson draw from his experience as 
a therapist, but his arguments are a reflection of the cultural tensions that 
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surround mental health care, and he positions his work within contemporaneous 
debates about developmental psychology. While we cannot understand Dobson’s 
career as a public figure without discussing religion, I do not mean to suggest 
that his formative works are something other than efforts to popularize a 
particular expertise-informed perspective about parenting. Dobson is a rhetor 
who makes populist arguments that depend upon expertise and upon religion. 
Evangelical Christianity and applied psychology are, for Dobson, complimentary 
ways of understanding social order, and an analysis of his work should try to 
understand how he combines the two.12 
 Taking seriously the religious aspects of Dobson’s work while avoiding the 
trap of describing Dobson as a religious figure can be difficult. Even Dan Gilgoff, 
whose book about Focus on the Family argues emphatically that Dobson’s work 
should be primarily understood as therapeutic rather than religious or 
conventionally “political,” titles a chapter about the Focus on the Family 
headquarters in Colorado Springs, “The American Vatican.” Sharon Crowley’s 
Toward a Civic Discourse, a book length examination of the Religious Right that 
uses Laclau’s and Mouffe’s articulation theory as its lens, includes a discussion of 
Dobson that offers an example of the hazards of discussing Dobson’s use of 
religious rhetoric without carefully considering the ways that these arguments 
depend upon a project concerned with advice about the family. Crowley’s most 
sustained engagement with Dobson is an explication of an exchange between 
Dobson and George Stephanopoulos about Senator Daniel Patrick Leahy’s 
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supposed hatred of conservative Christians because Leahy took a religious 
phrase out of an oath. Crowley writes:  
Dobson’s outburst can be read as an example of the conservative 
Christian habit of conducting argument from premises that are certified, 
prima facie, to be universally true. In the model of argument anyone who 
omits God’s name, innocently or not, on a ceremonial occasion wherein 
god has in the past been ritually invoked obviously does not have access to 
the divine reality wherein all events are dictated by the will of God. [. . .] 
And so Dobson’s tirade must be read as an example of Christian self-
victimization. (161) 
This treatment of Dobson badly misrepresents him as a public figure, and 
because it fails to locate the argument Dobson was making about Senator Leahy 
within his larger project, it neither helps us understand how Dobson uses 
religion rhetorically nor does it help us to understand how Dobson constructs 
“the religious” in his rhetoric. While Crowley’s intent is, of course, to make 
arguments about the Religious Right as a whole rather than to examine Dobson 
specifically, removing Dobson’s most strident statements from a long and 
important career as a parenting expert ignores the family-oriented project that 
made Dobson important.  
 More seriously, Crowley’s treatment of Dobson reflects a problematic 
dichotomy between “liberalism and Christian fundamentalism” that informs her 
understanding of the Religious Right (2). While Crowley’s point about Dobson’s 
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reliance on the authority of religion is well taken, the implicit dichotomy she 
draws between Dobson’s irrational, intractable partisanship and rational, 
deliberative liberal discourse does not take seriously Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
argument that all political work happens through rhetorical strategies that 
construct affiliation. Crowley writes: “A hegemony is any set of signifiers and 
practices that achieves a powerful, near-exclusive hold on a community’s beliefs 
and actions. [. . . ] It is important to remember that hegemony does not name an 
entity; a hegemony is a relation among competing ways of constructing the 
world” (63-4). By cordoning off the Religious Right from other rhetoric that 
engages in political articulation, Crowley obscures some of the important 
relations upon which Dobson’s rhetoric depends, specifically Dobson’s responses 
to cultural tensions surrounding the status of mental health care. The partisan 
articulations Dobson’s project constructs are founded, in part, upon the rational 
liberal tradition that Crowley claims are their opposite. 
 Jim Kuypers’s analysis of a letter Dobson wrote in 1993 in response to a 
change in policy about how fetal tissue could be used in research, while more 
sympathetic to Dobson and more inclusive in its understanding of the 
parameters of appropriate public rhetoric, similarly fails to take into account the 
complex intersection that Dobson’s rhetoric constructs. In a Focus on the Family 
newsletter, Dobson lambasted the decision as an assault on the unborn because 
it would (according to Dobson) eventually make late term abortion a common 
procedure. Kuypers argues that Dobson has been unfairly demonized because 
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his rhetoric opposes scientism in favor of an agentive, morally aware religious 
rhetoric:  
For Dobson, we are all implicated whether we want to be or not. Societal 
and human redemption begins with an individual’s agent’s action, 
however. Dobson was ‘going through’ drama here—science side steps 
human drama and does not confront moral issues. (155)  
While Dobson’s outraged, quite literally Jeremiadic (Dobson even invokes an 
apocalypse with references to Megiddo) religious response is a morally 
challenging rhetoric that implicates all of society, Kuypers idea that Dobson 
moves beyond scientism is overly neat, and it misses a key strategy in the letter.  
 Dobson’s letter is a religiously oriented moral drama, but it is also an 
argument that depends upon an ethos of medical knowledge. The articulation of 
rhetoric that depends upon interaction between Dobson’s expertise as a 
therapist and religious discourse is the kind of hegemonic work that Laclau and 
Mouffe encourage us to think about. The center of Dobson’s religious argument 
(I agree with Kuypers that Dobson’s argument is religious because of the strategy 
of “setting apart” the drama he constructs from the ordinary through the use of 
Jeremiad-like features, not because Dobson is motivated by religion) is a 
gruesome description of one particularly ghastly procedure for performing a very 
late term abortion: 
That process is not widely understood because the fetal researchers 
apparently don’t want the public to know what they are doing. [. .  . ] 
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Their method is called dilation and extraction or D & X. Over two days the 
cervix is dilated. Then an ultrasounds device and forceps are used to reach 
in a grab the baby’s feet. The little body is pulled downward until just the 
head remains in the cervix. Next, the abortionist grasps the nape of the 
neck and cuts open the back of the skull  with blunt scissors. A device 
called a cannula is then inserted into the wound and the brain material is 
sucked out. [. . .] Does this happen routinely? No, because there is no 
reason for a woman to carry a baby to term if she does not intend to let it 
live. But the advent of tissue harvesting changes the equation. (qdt. In 
Kuypers 159-160) 
Dobson introduces this section of the letter with a claim of special expertise: “the 
process is not widely understood” because the medical community has not been 
willing to discuss it with the public. He also makes a point to use unnecessary 
jargon. His choice to label the “cannula,” for example, does nothing to enhance 
our understanding of the procedure since he does not actually explain what it 
looks like or how it works. Dobson’s sometimes ironic “the” constructions (the 
“neutral” effect of the hypothetical “the” is here used as a way to outrage the 
reader) also demonstrate his ability to talk “like a doctor.”13 Also, the claim that a 
gruesome procedure that is almost never used would become common if the 
moral “equation” were changed by fetal tissue research implies knowledge about 
medical ethics and culture that the layperson does not have. Would opening a 
new line of fetal tissue lead to more late term abortions? Dobson’s claim is 
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supported primarily by his “expert” persona. Dobson, as a staunch pro-life voice, 
is, as Kuypers argues, rebuking the ethic of expediency (to borrow a phrase from 
Steven Katz) that he sees as a defining feature of medical research, but he is 
doing so as an insider. He is not sidestepping scientific culture, but strategically 
using fragments of it.  
The articulation of sacred space 
 Of course, both Crowley and Kuypers have agendas other than my own, 
and I do not mean to suggest that their analyses are not useful. However, their 
analyses fails to take seriously the ways in which religious rhetoric is a part of an 
intersection with professional expertise in Dobson’s work, and so their work 
does not explain how Dobson came to occupy such a powerful agentive position, 
nor does it paint a full picture of Dobson as a public figure. In order to describe 
religion as a part of an interdiscursive strategy, I need criteria for describing 
religious rhetoric that allows me to not only to identify religious rhetoric, but 
that allows me to discuss what religious rhetoric does.  What is religious rhetoric, 
and what does religious rhetoric add to the authority and logic that a rhetoric of 
professional expertise provides?   
 A starting point for a defining religious rhetoric is to define linguistic 
features that we might call “religious.” Kenneth Burke argues that religious 
discourse is defined by language that sets apart. Religious language, for Burke, 
reminds us of the distance between the scared and the profane, and the distance 
between the intelligible and the transcendent. Burke explains that religious 
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words function through difference and negation or through the appropriation of 
words in ways that are overtly metaphorical. In a religious context “father” and 
“bread” have meanings contrary to their literal definitions. Some words, in fact, 
like “spirit” or “glory” have become so enmeshed in religion that their 
naturalistic origins have been obscured. Other religious language functions 
through “not” word formations (“immortal”). Although the specific linguistic 
phenomena that Burke describes provides one way of defining religious rhetoric 
for analysis, the more general point Burke makes, that religious discourse is 
concerned with setting apart sacredness, defines religious discourse as a 
particular kind of rhetorical strategy that might be constructed and used in many 
different ways.14 
 Robert Reid, Jeffery Bullock, and David Fleer argue that contemporary 
American Christian discourse, which they call a “new homiletic,” is defined by 
dramaturgical rhetoric rather than reason: “We believe that the most productive 
aspect of this emerging paradigm shift in homiletic method is its focus on the 
creation of experience as opposed to a propositional privileging of content” (1). 
Their analysis provides a useful starting place for considering how Burke’s  
definition of religious language points toward criteria for describing religious 
discourse as a rhetorical strategy, and it begins to help us understand how 
religious rhetoric can be used as a source of authority. Richard Benjamin 
Crosby’s “Kairos as God’s Time in Martin Luther King Jr.’s Last Sunday 
Sermon,” is an example of criticism that explores one particular strategy for 
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“setting aside.” Crosby’s argument, which draws from Dale Sullivan’s idea that 
“belief” rhetoric is kairos oriented, is that Martin Luther King’s rhetoric creates 
“pauses” in time to set aside a sacred space in which persuasion can happen: “. . . 
We might surmise that, for King, the authority of God derives not from an 
opaque structure or strategic symbol; rather, it is located within a sanctified 
zone, a place set apart from the proverbial ‘outside’” (267). King’s formal 
approach mimics the concept of sacredness (which means “set apart”) and his 
purpose as a political actor: “[Rhetoric] is . . . a tool for social change– a way to 
alter the trajectory of time itself” (265).15 
 While formal analyses like Crosby’s are valuable for identifying features 
that might make rhetoric sacred, my own approach to thinking about religious 
discourse as one of several incommensurable hegemonic discourses is a bit 
different from Crosby’s project of exploring how sacredness is constructed. In 
order to discuss James Dobson’s work, I must acknowledge his use of rhetoric 
that sets his argument apart from the profane, but I must not do so in a way that 
does not fail to take into account the ways religions rhetoric is combined with 
arguments that depend upon his status as a psychologist. My response to 
Kuypers’ analysis of Dobson’s open letter about fetal tissue research and 
abortion (that artifact will be revisited in the next chapter) suggests how a text 
can draw from both professional expertise and religion, and the following 
analysis will further develop my treatment of agentive interdiscursivity in 
Dobson’s early work. My goal is not to refute my previous characterization of 
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Dobson’s work as being primarily concerned with the dissemination of expertise 
about the family, but to build upon that analysis by demonstrating the ways that 
Dobson uses religion to lend moral weight to his arguments. 
James Dobson’s sacred spaces 
 Dare to Discipline was Dobson’s entrance into public life, and it is 
therefore more narrowly focused on issues pertaining to pediatric psychology 
than his later work. When he wrote Dare to Discipline, the conversation that 
Dobson developed with his audience and with other public figures about 
parenting, family, Christianity, and culture was in its infancy, and the 
interdiscursive strategy that defined his career as a public figure, articulating 
psychological expertise with religious authority, was not yet fully developed. 
Dare to Discipline has, therefore, far fewer overtly religious statements, mostly 
delivered in passing, than texts Dobson produced just a few years later. I do not 
mean to suggest that there are no overtly religious references in the book or that 
Dobson’s arguments were not intended for a conservative Christian audience. 
Significantly, the book was published by Tyndale House, a Christian publisher, 
and in the book’s introduction, Dobson includes a quintessential example of his 
blend of religious rhetoric and expert authority:  
The recommendations in this manuscript are not experimental or 
speculative. They represent an approach to child management than can be 
trusted. [Discipline] bridges the generation gap which otherwise separates 
the family members who should love and trust each other. It allows the 
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God of our fathers to be introduced to our beloved children. [. . .] It 
encourages a child to respect his fellow men, and live as a responsible 
constructive citizen. (14) 
Here, Dobson augments his argument that his advice is practical and based on 
experience with an invocation to a past that is removed from transient everyday 
life. By instilling discipline, a parent can not only mend the “generation gap,” but 
she or he can piece together a lineage that runs to the distant past where “our 
fathers” lived. Here, Dobson argues that his advice moves the reader from the 
chaotic everyday world into a timeless, complete space. Here Dobson attempts, 
to use Crosby’s phrase, “to alter the trajectory of time itself” (265).  
 Few statements in Dare to Discipline are as markedly religious as the one 
analyzed above, but the strategy of stepping outside of the disordered present 
often reoccurs.  Revisiting a few passages analyzed in my last chapter with a 
focus on looking for instances when Dobson “sets aside” his arguments from 
what he characterizes as the dysfunctional muddle of the present suggests that 
even though Dobson was not yet forcefully advertising his Evangelical Christian 
worldview, the strategies he used might be characterized as prot0-religious 
rhetoric. Early in the book, even before Dobson has established the “tradition vs. 
transient fad” theme that drives his argument, Dobson claims that “The 
recommendations in this book are not experimental or speculative” (14). Later, 
when Dobson defends his advice by positioning it as a grounded alternative to 
the contemporaneous confusion in mental health care, he writes: 
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The American public has been subjected to many wildhorse opinions 
about child discipline, which have galloped off rapidly in all directions. 
Everyone. . . has his  own unique viewpoint about how children should be 
controlled, and what is worse, the experts have often been in direct 
contradiction with one another. (24) 
During the same discussion, Dobson steps outside of the present moment to 
argue that the contrast he draws, between timeless common sense and 
contemporary chaos, is one that might apply to any point in human history: 
Methods and philosophies regarding control of children have been the 
subject of heated debate and disagreement for centuries. [. . .] 
Unfortunately, the prevailing philosophy at a particular time seems to be 
more influential on parental approaches to discipline than does common 
sense. (23) 
Throughout the book, Dobson characterizes contemporary social changes as 
chaotic disorder caused by this transience. For example, he writes: “The rapid 
reversal of sexual mores is unparalleled in man’s history. Never has a society 
abandoned its concept of morality more suddenly than occurred in America 
during the decade of the sixties” (167).  
 Even though full-fledged religious rhetoric is scarce in Dare to Discipline, 
looking at the text with knowledge of Dobson’s later work allows us to recognize 
an embryonic version of the religious rhetoric that defines Dobson’s work. In 
1978’s The Strong Willed Child we can see Dobson more forcefully use religion 
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to argue that the wisdom of tradition is a remedy for faddish and destructive 
trends in contemporary psychology. The Strong Willed Child, while not 
nominally a sequel to Dare to Discipline, is in many ways a further development 
of the discussion began in the earlier book, and it often explicitly discusses the 
public career that Dare to Discipline began. The interdiscursivity that Dobson 
uses in the earlier book to unite his behaviorist program for parenting with 
moral authority and sacred space is found here in a form that is much more 
considered and much more explicit. By comparing the two texts, not only can we 
see Dobson becoming a more controlled, deliberate rhetor, but we can also more 
clearly the discourses that make Dare to Discipline more than just a parenting 
manual. In The Strong Willed Child, the gifted but sometimes erratic writer who 
wrote Dare to Discipline has grown into a more seasoned and bolder participant 
in public debate.  
 Dobson begins the second chapter of The Strong Willed Child, an 
extended explanation of his behaviorist program of using corporal punishment 
entitled “Shaping the Will,” with anecdotes about children who attempted to 
destroy copies of Dare to Discipline because the book led to their getting 
spanked:  
Dr. Benjamin Spock is loved by millions of children who have grown up 
under  his influence, but I am apparently resented by an entire generation 
of kids who would like to catch me in a blind alley on some cloudy night.  
It is obvious that children are aware of the contest of wills between 
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generations, and that is precisely why the parental response is so 
important. (30) 
Similar callbacks to Dare to Discipline, both thematic and explicit, run 
throughout the chapter and throughout the book. Clearly, Dobson’s agenda is to 
further explicate the themes of Dare to Discipline, and when we consider the 
timing of the book (it was published the same year that Dobson left his career as 
a psychologist to start the Focus on the Family radio show), Dobson’s choice to 
revisit a crucial moment in his career seems significant.16 We can see The Strong 
Willed Child as a touchstone text in Dobson’s career; it is Dobson’s forceful 
reassertion of himself in the public eye when he was at the cusp of his emergence 
as an everyday presence in his audience’s life. 
 Because The Strong Willed Child is specifically organized around the 
theme of tracing Dobson’s plan for discipline through different stages of a child’s 
life, his expertise in early childhood development is even more strongly felt than 
in Dare to Discipline, and Dobson occasionally uses language and argumentative 
strategies that are much more strongly marked by his background as a 
psychologist than he did the earlier book. The Strong Willed Child is much more 
clearly articulated to Dobson’s specific professional knowledge, and this 
knowledge is more precisely articulated to Dobson’s worldview.  For example, in 
a discussion about corporal punishment and toddlers, Dobson is careful to 
connect corporal punishment to social order (notice the word “justice,” used only 
semi-ironically) to biological information about cognition: “A toddler’s memory 
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is not sufficiently developed to permit even a ten-minute delay in the 
administration of justice” (47). Later, Dobson engages in a long discussion of a 
study published in the APA Monitor: “It is increasingly clear that the origins of 
human competence are to be found in a critical period of development between 
eight and eighteen months of age” (49). In other places, Dobson deepens his 
engagement with other psychologists, including one passage that is something of 
a reconciliation with Benjamin Spock (98-99), and others that bash specific 
contemporary psychologists for advocating what Dobson saw as radical 
permissiveness:  
Let me repeat that these recommendations were not written by an 
unknown crank from somewhere out in never-never land. They are the 
philosophical offering of one of America’s best known educators. [. . . ] 
Mr. Holt’s views are shared by others who “advocate the overthrow of 
parental authority in just about every area.” A psychologist named 
Richard Farson has written a similar and equally outrageous book entitled 
Birthrights: a bill of Rights for Children. (166-167) 
The Strong Willed Child repeats Dare to Discipline’s strategy of fusing 
behaviorist explanations with a rhetoric of conservative common sense and 
social order, and Dobson repeats the strategy of drawing from his experience as 
a psychologist in order to make his points. Siggy, Dobson’s dog whose training 
was used to illustrate behaviorism in Dare to Discipline, even makes another 
appearance as an object lesson (12-13).  
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 The Strong Willed Child’s response to mental health care is similar to that 
found in Dare to Discipline, but where Dare to Discipline was disorganized and 
sometimes vague or hyperbolic, The Strong Willed Child is strategic in its 
organization and crisp in its deployment of professional expertise. Dobson 
positions Benjamin Spock as a new ally (he points out that Spock advocates 
corporal punishment) and finds more outspokenly progressive parenting experts 
to position himself against. Dobson quotes mainstream psychological research at 
length. Siggy, Dobson’s mascot for behaviorism, is no longer an anecdote, but a 
figure who bookends the text, appearing in the introduction and in an epilogue 
describing poor Siggy’s last days. (In the first edition, Siggy also appears in 
pictures of Dobson and his family that appear in a glossy insert in middle of the 
book.) 
 As striking as the further development of Dobson’s response to mental 
health care is in The Strong Willed Child, the newly emphatic deployment of 
religious rhetoric is even more so. Dobson includes long passages about the 
Bible, and he includes material originally published in a Christian magazine. In 
Dare to Discipline, Dobson was speaking to a conservative Christian audience, 
but in The Strong Willed Child, an audience of conservative Christians is 
explicitly invoked. More importantly, he engages in rhetoric that sets the sacred 
aside as a space from which he can speak with greater authority, and he uses 
religious rhetoric to buttress his claims about parenting.  The hints of sacred 
space Dare to Discipline contain (along with the one explicit invocation of it) are, 
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in The Strong Willed Child, more forcefully and methodically constructed. In a 
passage about Thomas Gordon, a progressive parenting expert who was then 
popular among Christians, Dobson writes: 
I sympathize with Dr. Gordon in his suspicions of human wisdom. I 
would lack confidence, too, if I had no standard of guide upon which to 
base my parental judgments and determinations. However, the Christian 
mother and father need not “lean on their own understanding,” for they 
have access to the wisdom of God Himself. [. . . ]. . . I’m inclined to see his 
system as only one of many recent offerings in the field of psychology 
which blatantly contradict the Judeo-Christian  ethic. Traditions which 
have been honored for several thousand years are suddenly vilified. (176) 
Here the implication of temporal and spatial set apartness that was mostly 
hinted at in Dare to Discipline is explicitly acknowledged. Where Dare to 
Discipline’s use of sacred space is mostly implicit, The Strong Willed Child 
emphatically connects Dobson’s behaviorist model of parenting to the Judeo-
Christian tradition. Religious rhetoric provides a position from which Dobson 
can complain about the transient nature of contemporary psychology and from 
which he can venerate common sense, cause-and-effect parenting, which for 
Dobson is a behaviorist program that enforces social conservatism. In a passage 
from “Shaping the Will” (“the will” is a biblical allusion), a chapter largely 
devoted to tailoring punishments to a child’s state of cognitive development, 
Dobson includes the following passage:   
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Most of the favorable attitudes that should be taught are actually 
extrapolations of the Judeo-Christian ethic, including honesty, respect, 
kindness, love, human dignity, obedience, responsibility, reverence, etc. 
And how are these time-honored principles conveyed to the next 
generation? The answer was provided by Moses as he wrote more than 
3,000 years ago in the book of Deuteronomy: "Impress them on your 
children. Talk about them when you sit at home and when you walk along 
the road, when you lie down and when you get up. Tie them as symbols on 
your hands and bind them on your foreheads. Write them on the 
doorframes of your houses and on your gates."  (Deuteronomy 6:7-9). 
(56) 
Although this passage is less closely articulated to the substance of Dobson’s 
argument, it is much more emphatic in removing the reader from everyday life 
into a space into an overarching “timeless” tradition. Dobson literally says that 
his advice is supported by a 3,000 document, but the implication of giving voice 
to a major figure from the Bible is that his vision of the family is eternal.  
For a contemporary reader one of the most striking aspects of The Strong Willed 
Child is that it includes, in a chapter about adolescence, a long discussion of 
abortion. Dobson concludes the chapter as follows: “Why have pastors and 
ministers been so timid and mute on the vital matter? It is time that the 
Christian church found its tongue and spoke in defense of the unborn children 
who plead for their own lives” (230). Here we see Dobson, using temporal 
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language reminiscent of Martin Luther King’s language discussed in Crosby’s 
essay, attaching the audience that he has invoked to fight about a specific issue. 
This passage hints at how the worldview Dobson articulates throughout the text 
would come to define partisanship in the United States in the coming years.  
Articulation and public life 
 “Articulation” is a rich term. Like many terms from cultural studies 
theory, it is ambiguous and pun laden. To articulate might mean to join together, 
to put into motion, or to explicate rhetorically. In Dare to Discipline and The 
Strong Willed Child we see James Dobson articulating, in all three senses, a new 
vision of the family. He is hardly the first conservative thinker to argue that we 
should understand society in terms of the family, but his particular fusion of 
arguments drawn from expert opinion and religious rhetoric connect social 
conservatism to contemporary scientific culture, commonsense logic, and 
supernatural authority in important new ways. Dobson also connects broad 
opinions about social order to the most intimate relationships in his audience’s 
lives. This fusion animated a broad Evangelical mental health care project, and it 
helped to define an emerging “family values” discourse. By joining together 
mental health care and conservative Christianity, Dobson also provided an 
important model for persuasive rhetoric. In the following chapter will turn my 
attention to considering how the particular interdiscursive strategy that Dobson 
invented can be used in direct rhetorical combat.   
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 The following chapter, “Interdiscursive Agency and the Public Sphere: 
James Dobson’s Hegemonic Rhetoric,” contains analyses of Dobson’s letter 
accompanying the Meese Commission report about pornography (1986), further 
analysis of the jeremiad-like argument against the Clinton administration’s 
proposed changes in stem cell research policy (1993), and analysis of a widely 
commented upon epistolary editorial Dobson wrote about the dangers that 
Barack Obama posed to the country if elected (2008). My rhetorical analysis of 
those texts offers further consideration of Dobson’s interdiscursive strategy, and 
it demonstrates how strategies Dobson pioneered when he was a parenting 
expert proved useful in his later work as a polemicist. While my primary aim so 
far has been to explore the importance of everyday cultural work that articulates 
cultural perspectives and political affiliations, agentive interdiscursivity is also a 
useful lens for analyzing artifacts concerned with arguments about public policy. 
The strategies Dobson invented through his work as a parenting expert allowed 
him to occupy a powerful position in public life, and it remained important to his 
rhetoric when he was directly engaged in arguments about public policy.  
 One of the major contributions that Laclau and Mouffe (along with 
precedents like Gramsci and later developers of articulation theory like 
Grossberg) have made is to provide a framework for discussions of politics that 
happen outside the “political” sphere. Articulation theory asks us to see “culture” 
as a shifting set of tensions against which social class and political partisanship 
are formed, and it points us toward taking seriously the rhetorical work of 
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constructing the everyday. In my treatment of Dobson so far, I have tried to 
suggest that rhetorical criticism, which has typically been concerned with 
unpacking the ways that important, “political” artifacts function, can benefit 
substantially from further engagement exploring how “apolitical” texts help to 
construct political partisanship. James Dobson’s contributions to policy debate 
and his comments and writings about electoral politics are important, but this 
work was founded on his work as a parenting expert. The following chapter is a 
demonstration of the connections between James Dobson, the family therapist, 
and James Dobson, the conservative firebrand.  
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CHAPTER IV  
 
INTERDISCURSIVE AGENCY AND THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
 
James Dobson’s Hegemonic Rhetoric 
 
 
 Articulation theory is an extrapolation Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony. Hegemony, often described as something like “the status quo” or 
“socially produced common sense,” simply refers to the ideological assumptions 
that keep a society in order. Hegemony is both the beliefs that justify the 
economic and political order and the spectrum of arguments that are permissible 
within that order. Hegemony is, to use a Marxian commonplace, that which 
allows for the reproduction of the means of production. Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
contribution to hegemonic theory is to emphasize the degree to which hegemony 
is contingent. What we understand as common sense is always being remade 
upon a shifting ground of rhetorical opportunity. For Laclau and Mouffe, 
hegemony is not a monolithic set of social rules, but a discursive horizon within 
which different ways of talking about reality are disconnected and reconnected 
in ways that both reflect and shape our social and material circumstances. 
Hegemony, according to articulation theory, is not a list of maxims or a coherent 
worldview into which subjects are enrolled, but the grounds for a complex and 
often self-contradictory struggle over rhetorical situation.  
Because articulation theory emphasizes connections between discursive 
strategies and their consequences, it can be described as a broad and profoundly 
rhetorical way of understanding political work. I have, through my exploration 
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of agentive interdiscursivity, attempted to foreground the rhetorical aspects of 
articulation theory by exploring the ways in which civic participation is enabled 
by incommensurable combinations of argumentative and stylistic elements. 
More specifically, I have argued that James Dobson was able to position himself 
as an important agent and to enroll his audience into a specific partisan 
worldview through strategically interdiscursive rhetoric. James Dobson became 
a public figure by giving expertise informed practical advice about the intimate, 
everyday aspects of his audience’s lives (usually, and most importantly, about 
parenting, but his early works also include advice about marriage, friendship, 
mental health, and sexuality), but his advice is bound to a particular conservative 
narrative about recent American history, to broad claims about epistemology in 
psychology, and to the authority of conservative Christianity. While it would be 
reductive to argue that Dobson was a successful popular public mental health 
expert and an influence on American public life just because he used a particular 
rhetorical strategy, I can safely claim that the interdiscursivity that defines 
Dobson’s work allowed him to occupy a position that, to borrow a feminist 
slogan, made the personal political. Dobson might not have often ventured into 
conventional activism until recently (as I will discuss in this chapter, in 2004 he 
became a more direct participant in Republican Party politics), but when we 
consider his rhetoric in light of the articulations that it constructs, the 
importance of agentive interdiscursivity in Dobson’s career becomes apparent. 
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The interdiscursive strategy that defines Dobson’s work can be found in a 
somewhat embryonic form in the occasionally powerful but often undisciplined 
prose of Dobson’s debut, Dare to Discipline (1970). In The Strong Willed Child, 
Dobson’s rhetoric is much more carefully controlled, and the combinations of 
psychological expertise and religious authority that define his work are much 
more emphatic. In this following chapter, I will explore how the interdiscursivity 
that defines these formative works appears in more conventionally “political” 
texts from later in Dobson’s career. My first goal in doing so is simply to 
incorporate a broader corpus of texts into my analysis. Since my contention is 
that agentive interdiscursivity is a central part of Dobson’s success and influence, 
I need to show more examples of Dobson using it, and so by expanding my 
analysis to include different kinds of artifacts written across several decades, I 
hope to demonstrate further the centrality of agentive interdiscursivity in 
Dobson’s career. My second goal is to demonstrate a clear relationship between 
the partisan enrollment the rhetorical strategies Dobson used in his early career 
enabled and the explicit political advocacy that became an increasingly 
important part of Dobson’s legacy to the social conservatism. My argument is 
that the interdiscursivity that marks Dobson’s work as a public mental health 
professional should be understood as a kind of political rhetoric, and so I need to 
demonstrate a relationship between Dobson’s nominally apolitical writing about 
parenting and his more emphatic forays into activism.17 
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 I will begin with a discussion of the tension between Dobson’s public 
persona as a mental health expert and his status as an important conservative 
activist. Despite his importance to the Religious Right and despite his reputation 
as a staunch figure from the Religious Right, Dobson has consistently described 
himself as a reluctant participant in political debate, even going so far as to 
maintain that his career is primarily apolitical. I will then perform analysis of 
three prominent examples of Dobson’s work as a polemicist: Dobson’s letter 
accompanying the Meese Commission report about pornography (1986), his 
jeremiad-like argument against the Clinton administration’s proposed changes 
in stem cell research policy (which I discussed briefly in my last chapter) (1993), 
and a widely commented upon epistolary editorial he wrote warning about the 
dangers of the election of Barack Obama (2008). I will conclude with a brief 
discussion of the ways that Dobson’s use of his authority as psychologist might 
be considered problematic that looks forward to my concluding chapter, 
“Looking Forward: Expertise and Evangelical Mental Health Care.” Throughout 
my analysis of Dobson’s rhetoric I have avoided confronting issues about the 
legitimacy of Dobson’s use of expertise in his work, and I have avoided talking 
about the larger project of Christian mental health care that Dobson helped to 
pioneer. My concluding chapter will acknowledge complications that might be 
brought to bear upon my work, and it will look toward future research about the 
political consequences of Christian mental health care. My dissertation concerns 
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public address that sprang from Evangelical mental health care. As I go forward 
in my work, I hope to engage more closely Christian mental health care itself.  
James Dobson the activist 
In the forward to his 2007 history of Focus on the Family, Dan Gilgoff 
argues that Focus on the Family is the most important conservative organization 
in the United States, but its power has been largely overlooked because, 
paradoxically, Focus on the Family is “primarily [an] apolitical organization” 
(XV). Similarly, throughout his career James Dobson has consistently presented 
himself as a parenting expert whose sense of social responsibility has led him 
occasionally into the limelight rather than as an influential political figure. When 
Dobson has participated in conventionally “political” work, he has used his 
“apolitical” status as a rhetorical tool by presenting himself as having been 
forced to speak out because of the gravity of the circumstance. For example, in a 
2004 interview with the New York Times about his participation in activism 
against marriage equality, Dobson claimed, “There are dangers [in becoming too 
partisan] . . . and that is why I have never done it before. But the attack and 
assault on marriage is so distressing that I just feel like I can’t remain silent” 
(qtd. in Buss, 6). Dale Buss’s sympathetic authorized biography of Dobson 
argues that in 2004 Dobson’s increased profile on the national stage was not an 
inevitable development that grew out of Dobson’s longstanding associations with 
the conservative movement but the result of his being compelled to enter the 
limelight because of an impending crisis:  
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Dobson sensed no freedom regarding the decision to cross the great 
divide into partisanship and take Focus with him. Instead, he felt 
absolutely compelled to do so, coming to believe that this decision was at 
the same time a logical, necessary, and even divinely inspired culmination 
of everything he has accomplished and everything else he had strived for 
over the previous quarter century. (7) 
The circumlocution of Buss’s explanation is striking; Dobson’s emergence as a 
partisan activist was a departure from his work as a parenting expert that was 
forced on him, but it was also somehow the “culmination” of his career as a 
public figure.  
Dobson’s approach to political engagement did change somewhat in 2004 
in that he became a part of the movement against marriage equality and in that 
he explicitly endorsed and campaigned for George W. Bush. Before 2004, 
Dobson’s political engagement, both in his nominally apolitical work as family 
expert and in his forays into public service and into debating specific policy, was 
less aligned with the Republican Party, so much so that he was something of a 
problem for them. As I discussed in my opening chapter, Dobson has, when he 
has participated in traditional partisan politics, pushed the GOP further to the 
right on social issues. Before 2004, Dobson was more of a threat from the right 
than an advocate of the GOP platform, and his claims to have avoided partisan 
politics can be understood as a description of his sometimes antagonistic 
relationship with his party. It is worth noting that during Dobson’s pre-2004 
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career, he sometimes enrolled figures from across the political spectrum into his 
rhetoric. For example, in his note accompanying the report from Meese 
Commission on Pornography, he sympathetically quotes Andrea Dworkin, a 
militant feminist. (Also, my previous chapter discusses his positive mentions of 
Benjamin Spock in The Strong Willed Child.)  
However, even before he explicitly began to act as an ally for the 
Republican Party, Dobson was consistently involved in defining the political 
fault lines of American politics. It is noteworthy that he served on several 
committees for Ronald Reagan, but he was a harsh critic of Bill Clinton. While he 
held back from actively collaborating with the Republican Party in electoral 
politics until 2004, Dobson was anything but non-partisan during the eighties 
and nineties. If anything, Dobson’s independence from the conservative 
establishment and the huge audience he commanded as the figurehead of a 
popular conservative media empire made him a more partisan, if less noticed by 
those outside of his primary audience, figure than he would have been if he had 
been willing to compromise his principals to help the GOP through electoral 
cycles. And of course, 2004 was hardly the first time that James Dobson had 
made noteworthy contributions to public debates that strayed from his expertise 
as a parenting expert. In 1981, only three years after the Focus on the Family 
radio broadcast began, Dobson co-founded the Family Research Council, an 
organization devoted to lobbying for social conservative causes (FRC was at that 
time affiliated with Focus on the Family), and during the nineties was actively 
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involved pushing the Republican Party toward a more ideologically pure stance 
on social issues, particularly abortion. In 2002 Dobson became a member of the 
Arlington Group, a panel of social conservative leaders who helped to make 
opposing marriage equality a central issue in the 2004 election.18 It is 
noteworthy that two of the three strongly polemic artifacts analyzed in this 
chapter predate Dobson’s 2004“coming out” at a conservative activist by over a 
decade. 
Even though I disagree with a characterization of Dobson, who a 2005 
profile described as “the religious right’s 800-Pound gorilla,” as anything other 
than an active and powerful participant in partisan politics,  James Dobson’s 
disavowals of his status as a political animal (and  those of his supporters) are 
neither  disingenuous nor simply wrong (Learning). James Dobson’s career 
demands a more nuanced and inclusive idea of “politics” than one that would 
exclude the important work that Dobson did to define American social 
conservatism. If I take issue with Dobson’s and Buss’s claims that Dobson has 
abstained from politics until 2004, it is because they define “politics” as a very 
specific type of activism while I define it as the work of enrolling an audience 
into a particular worldview through articulation. For me, Dobson became an 
important political figure with the publication of 1970’s Dare to Discipline. 
As Donna Minkowitz notes, for Dobson, religiously motivated “right-wing 
goals and [a] nurturing agenda are one,” and Dobson has always presented his 
work as a public figure as an outgrowth of his concern with the family. Dobson’s 
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denials of his status as a political figure are not subterfuge; they are examples of 
the kind of incongruity that articulation theory predicts. Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that politics is cultural work that connects together new rhetorical 
situations, and Dobson’s articulation of “right wing goals” and “a nurturing 
agenda” represent a powerful example of that kind of work. Lawrence Grossberg 
writes that articulation “often involves delinking or disarticulating connections 
in order to connect others” (54). Dobson is an important political player, but his 
self-presentation as apolitical figure is not fraudulent. Making sense of that 
apparent contradiction demands an alternate framing that takes into account the 
paradoxes that articulation includes.  
 James Dobson’s nuanced arguments about mental health care and his 
use of religious discourse does not suggest a disingenuous manipulator cheating 
his audience, but a rhetor working to reorient the relationship between 
professional expertise and personal conviction. I have demonstrated the ways 
that Dobson’s arguments about the family depend both upon his authority as a 
psychologist and upon behaviorist arguments drawn from cultural tensions 
surrounding mental health care, and I have discussed how Dobson combines 
these arguments with rhetoric that creates sacred space. In the following 
analysis, I will discuss the ways that Dobson modulated his interdiscursive 
rhetorical strategy for different contexts. While Dobson’s forays into 
conventional political debate construct the same kind of complex articulation as 
his writing about parenting, and while we can understand Dobson’s “political” 
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writing as being a part of the same rhetorical project as his therapeutic writing, 
he skillfully modulates the articulations of mental health expertise to religion for 
different rhetorical situations.  
James Dobson’s contribution to the Meese Commission 
 One of Dobson’s first prominent appearances in national politics was his 
participation in writing the report for the Attorney General's Commission on 
Pornography (more often referred to as the Meese Commission after Attorney 
general Edwin Meese), in 1986. Dobson had been involved with national public 
service before, including having worked on the Task Force for the White House 
Conferences on the Family for Jimmy Carter and having been appointed by 
Reagan in 1982 to the National Advisory Commission for the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, but the Meese Commission was a much 
more contentious and powerful post. The commission’s report could lead to a 
wide spectrum of actions, including criminal prosecution. While the makeup of 
the panel was diverse, given the political climate of 1986, the purpose of the 
panel was implicitly to provide for more stringent enforcement of obscenity laws. 
A section entitled “Recommendations For The Justice System And Law 
Enforcement Agencies” contains the following passage: “Deterrence should be a 
significant factor in fashioning an appropriate sentence in [obscenity] cases. 
Only public awareness of firm but fair sentencing practices in obscenity cases 
can foster an environment conducive to controlling the flow of these materials.” 
Later, in the same section, the report argues “. . . we are engaged in a winnable 
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war! America could rid itself of hard core pornography in 18 months if the 
recommendations offered in the following report are implemented. We have 
provided a road-map for . . . the mobilization of law enforcement efforts around 
the country.” The research conducted in preparation for the report focused not 
on only depictions of consensual heterosexual sex in mainstream pornography, 
but on “underground” and sometimes already illegal material, and the report 
includes a disproportionate focus on depictions of extreme fetishes, 
sadomasochism, pedophilia and bestiality.19 Accompanying the report is a 
personal statement from Dobson that dwells almost entirely on graphic 
descriptions of sexual sadism and child abuse. Dobson writes: 
When asked to describe pornography currently on the market, they think 
in terms of airbrushed centerfolds in the popular "men's magazines." But 
steady customers of pornography have long since grown tired of simple 
heterosexual nudity. Indeed, a visit to an adult bookstore quickly reveals 
the absence of so-called "normal" sexuality. [. . .] This is the world of 
pornography today, and I believe the public would rise up in wrath to 
condemn it if they knew of its prominence.  
Dobson focuses almost exclusively on deviance and criminality, and he 
indiscriminately lumps together alternative sexual practices with child abuse and 
bestiality. His statement is clearly designed to outrage. He concludes by charging 
American citizenry with the responsibility to wipe out the plague that is the adult 
entertainment industry: 
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Accordingly, it is my hope that the effort we invested will provide the 
basis for a new public policy. But that will occur only if American citizens 
demand action from their government. Nothing short of a public outcry 
will motivate our slumbering representatives to defend community 
standards of decency. It is that public statement that the pornographers 
fear most, and for very good reason. The people possess the power in this 
wonderful democracy to override apathetic judges, uninterested police 
chiefs, unmotivated U.S. Attorneys, and unwilling federal officials. I pray 
that they will do so. If they do not, then we have labored in vain. 
As my analysis will demonstrate, Dobson strategically uses interdiscursivity in 
order to “render salient” a context, to borrow Vatz’s phrase, which makes this 
call to arms credible (160).20 
 Early in Dobson’s statement, he frames the Meese Commission report in 
quasi-religious terms, suggesting both a sense of moral obligation that informs 
his call to arms against the adult entertainment industry and a sense of righteous 
authority for the report’s findings. Dobson writes: 
I now understand how mountain climbers must feel when they finally 
stand atop the highest peak. They overcome insurmountable obstacles to 
reach the rim of the world and announce proudly to one another, "we 
made it!" In a similar context, I feel a sense of accomplishment as the 
Commission releases its final report to the President, the Attorney 
General, and the people. For a brief moment in Scottsdale last month, it 
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appeared that our differing philosophies would strand us on the lower 
slopes. And of course, we were monitored daily by the ACLU, the 
pornographers, and the press, who huddled together and murmured with 
one voice, "they are doomed!" But now as we sign the final document and 
fling it about to the public, it does not seem pretentious to indulge 
ourselves in the satisfaction of having accomplished our goals. 
Dobson does not simply use grandiose, religious-sounding images; he uses 
metaphors that create sacred space in which he locates his argument. Dobson’s 
metaphorical mountain is not just a vaguely religious-sounding, impressive 
description, but a subtle allusion to Mt. Sinai, the place where God handed down 
the law to the Israelites. (This allusion is indirect and playful, but real, as the 
popular expression “down from the mountain” to which Dobson clearly alludes 
refers to Exodus.)  The suggestion that the Meese report is somewhat like the 
Old Testament might be read as self-effacing since the grandeur on display here 
is uncharacteristic of Dobson, who generally writes in a “folksy” vernacular, 
although Dobson’s awareness of the “pretension” of the passage suggests not. 
(This passage is also reminiscent of Martin Luther King’s description of civil 
rights as being a mountaintop, described in Crosby’s essay.) Dobson’s emphasis 
on the struggle the committee had to assemble the report dramatizes the labor of 
writing the report in a way that emphasizes both the seriousness of the 
commission’s task and the physicality of Dobson’s metaphor. The clause “For a 
brief moment in Scottsdale last month, it appeared that our differing 
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philosophies would strand us on the lower slopes” encourages us to imagine the 
Meese commission as having worked to travel to a different space, as does “But 
now as we sign the final document and fling it about to the public.” The Meese 
report comes, according to this rhetorical strategy, from a space removed from 
the everyday world, “the highest peak” of a mountain that could only be reached 
by an arduous journey.  
 Although Dobson’s mountaintop passage does not borrow any rhetoric 
from mental health care, implicit in the passage is his authority as a 
psychologist. The “differing philosophies” that were the cause for the struggle to 
the top of the mountain alludes to Dobson’s professional expertise (which the 
reader can learn about in detail in a biography page at the beginning of the 
report). Later in the report, Dobson occasionally slips into a voice that suggests 
an expertise-oriented persona. For example, he writes “Though social research 
on this subject has been difficult to conduct, the totality of evidence supports the 
linkage between illustration and imitation.” The audience is encouraged to 
accept Dobson’s claims that “the totality of evidence” supports his position, even 
though he admits that research on the topic has been “difficult to conduct.” 
Later, Dobson’s arguments assume the kind of commonsense behaviorism that 
characterizes his writing about the family: “For a certain percentage of men, the 
use of pornographic material is addictive and progressive. Like the addiction to 
drugs, alcohol or food, those who are hooked on sex become obsessed by their 
need.”  
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Near his conclusion, Dobson pulls together the various strands running 
through his statement into an argument about social order strongly reminiscent 
of his writing about the family. His argument is ultimately that that the addictive 
properties of pornography and the subversive images contained therein 
undermine the family, which, for Dobson, is the foundation of society.  Dobson 
writes: 
Furthermore, what is at stake here is the future of the family itself. We are 
sexual creatures, and the physical attraction between males and females 
provides the basis for every dimension of marriage and parenthood. Thus, 
anything that interjects itself into that relationship must be embraced 
with great caution. Until we know that pornography is not addictive and 
progressive ... until we are certain that the passion of fantasy does not 
destroy the passion of reality ... until we are sure that obsessive use of 
obscene materials will not lead to perversions and conflict between 
husbands and wives . . . then we dare not adorn them with the crown of 
respectability. [Ellipses Dobson’s] Society has an absolute obligation to 
protect itself from material which crosses the line established objectively 
by its legislators and court system. That is not sexual repression. That is 
self-preservation.  
The key moment in this passage, because it establishes context for the rest of the 
passage is, “We are sexual creatures, and the physical attraction between males 
and females provides the basis for every dimension of marriage and 
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parenthood.” In the worldview Dobson establishes here, social order grows out 
of an almost mechanistic view of nature. Men and women are physically 
designed to fit together, and when something “interjects itself into that 
relationship,” society is threatened. While Dobson does not make any religious 
appeals in this passage, the divide between timeless natural order and transient, 
impulsive social experimentation implies a contrast between the authority of 
sacred space and the chaos of the profane, particularly when presented as 
wisdom delivered from a sacred mountain. When is framed by this worldview, 
which puts tradition, nature, and God on one side and immorality, violence, and 
uncertainty on the other, Dobson’s call for a more authoritarian approach 
toward sexually explicit media is not prudish or outdated, but urgent and 
morally powerful. The force that Dobson’s articulations of sacred space to 
strategies derived from his expertise as mental health care professional carry 
suggest the power of rhetoric that engages with hegemony.  Dobson builds upon 
powerful presumptions, and so his arguments seen current even as they resist 
contemporaneous popular culture. 
James Dobson’s statement against stem cell research 
 My previous chapter provides analysis of a Focus on the Family 
newsletter, written in 1993, in which Dobson lambasted a decision by the Clinton 
administration to open up new lines of stem cells for research. Dobson argues 
that Clinton’s decision would affect the norms of medical ethics so that late term 
abortion would be more common. My analysis was a response to Jim Kuypers’ 
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analysis, which argues that Dobson’s letter sets aside scientism in favor of moral 
drama. Kuypers overlooks the ways that Dobson’s expertise as a therapist is a 
part of the context that Dobson creates for his argument. Dobson’s graphic 
description of late term abortion, which includes medical jargon, references to 
specific instruments (that are not described for the reader), and syntactical 
features of scientific writing, is a key part of the text.21  
The interdiscursivity identified in the in the passage I scrutinized my third 
chapter runs throughout the letter. This artifact is noteworthy because it is a text 
where Dobson uses especially pronounced medical rhetoric alongside especially 
pronounced religious rhetoric.  Even though interdiscursivity is a key part of 
Dobson’s rhetorical style, his incorporation of both professional expertise and 
religious discourse is sometimes implicit rather than strongly marked. In the 
1993 letter, we see Dobson talking directly to an Evangelical audience about 
public policy that pertains to his expertise as a therapist, and so his strategies are 
both strongly informed by his expertise and strongly informed by religion.  
Before Dobson offers the graphic description of late term abortion I discussed in 
my last chapter, he explicitly signals his medical expertise, using a strategy that 
creates a rich context for his argument. Dobson writes:  
There is something deeply troubling about cannibalizing tiny bodies of 
living babies—even for humanitarian purposes. More unsettling is the 
method by which their tissue is taken from them. That process is not 
widely understood because the fetal researchers apparently don't want the 
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public to know what they are doing. There have been only a few 
descriptions of methodology in medical journals, which gives us a clue 
that sensitive information is being withheld. (qtd. in Kuypers 159) 
This passage not only depends on Dobson’s expert authority but argues that, in 
this case, medicine is in conflict with the natural order. His choice of the word 
“cannibalizing” to describe using fetal tissue in research frames the practice not 
just as a violation of medical ethics but as the violation of an ancient taboo; 
parents do not eat their young, and so this kind of stem cell research is 
unnatural. Dobson does not make a philosophical argument against the practice; 
instead, he makes an argument that it is wrong because it is “deeply troubling.” 
While this particular deployment of Dobson’s strategy of favorably contrasting 
timeless tradition versus social experimentation is not specifically religious, it 
does posit a fit between the natural order and tradition, and it argues forcefully 
against social experimentation. Again, Dobson argues that both biology and 
tradition exist outside of the chaos of the present.  
The dichotomy Dobson establishes in setting up his argument provides a 
context for the rest of the message. He is an expert sensitive not only to issues of 
medical research and practice and of how they do and do not conform to what is 
natural, but also to the value of timeless wisdom and ancient authority. As the 
message continues, both of those appeals become more prominent. He argues, 
for example, that he knows not only the technical details of late term abortion, 
but that he understands enough about medical culture to be able to anticipate 
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how changes in stem cell research policy would affect how doctors would 
understand their work: “. . . there is no reason for a woman to carry a baby to 
term if she does not intend to let it live. But the advent of tissue harvesting 
changes the equation. [. . . ]. Growing babies only to be dismembered for the use 
of their organs appears to be on the horizon.” His word choice “growing babies 
only to be dismembered” (qtd. in Kuypers 160) again suggests that the 
wrongness of using cells from fetuses for research is directly related to its 
unnaturalness. The passage not only suggests Dobson’s expertise, but it also 
evokes0 a dystopian horror reminiscent of science fiction. The letter climaxes in 
a passage that explicitly evokes religion and that places Dobson’s argument in a 
different temporal and special context: 
Just one week earlier, [I] had visited the archeological ruins of the ancient 
city of Megiddo, described nine times in the Old Testament. This 6,000-
year-old city is thought to be one of the "high places" where King Ahab 
and Queen Jezebel led the Israelites in Baal worship and the wholesale 
sacrifice of children. Still standing in what was the courtyard of the city is 
a large circular altar on which scholars believe untold numbers of babies 
were murdered. 
[. . . ] 
As I stood among the ruins of Megiddo and contemplated the horrors that 
occurred in that tragic place, I found it difficult to fight back the tears. 
Among the rocks surrounding the alter, we found numerous bone 
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fragments, which a physician in our party believed to be from very young 
children. I could almost hear the screams of babies echoing across more 
than 27 centuries and attesting to the depravity of mankind. What struck 
me in the ruins of that sad city was how little has really changed. (qtd. in 
Kuypers 161) 
Especially noteworthy is Dobson’s choice to include allusions to forensic 
evidence in this passage, including a mention of a physician. Dobson’s 
articulation of science and religion has become so pronounced that his 
description of policy change about stem cells is both a technological dystopia and 
a jeremiad.  
Just as he does in his statement accompanying the Meese Commission 
Report, Dobson concludes by placing the family in a timeless social order. He 
writes: 
Among the primary objectives of Focus on the Family is a commitment to 
the disadvantaged, wherever they may be found. In a sense, the family 
itself is in that position today. It has been ridiculed and written off as an 
anachronism. But with your continued help, we will stand our ground in 
defense of every good and perfect gift that comes from the Father. (qtd. in 
Kuypers 163) 
Dobson does not connect the dots between late term abortion and dissolution of 
the nuclear family, but the suggestion is that disrupting order through changing 
policy about stem cell research would lead to more serious disruptions in the 
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fabric of society. This passage, in which “anachronism” of the patriarchal family 
is equated with the timeless “good and perfect [gifts] that come from the father” 
again places Dobson’s worldview outside of the transience of  ordinary time, and 
it reads as a benediction for the biomedical jeremiad he has just delivered.  
Again, Dobson connects his outrage at contemporary American life to powerful, 
hegemonic discourses.  
James Dobson speaks out against Barack Obama 
 In 2008 James Dobson made perhaps his most high profile foray into 
conventional politics when he distributed a long (16 pages) polemic against 
Barack Obama through Focus on the Family. Dobson retired completely from 
the organization just two years later, and we might understand this missive as 
Dobson’s parting shot before moving to a less high profile organization called 
Family Talk. This document might be understood as Dobson’s final word about 
American politics particularly because it is so inclusive. The text is a rambling 
artifact that attempts to cover every conceivable issue that a conservative like 
Dobson might have with American liberalism, including abortion, free speech, 
foreign policy, health care policy, tax policy, pornography, gun rights, the war on 
terror, the “fairness doctrine” (a proposal a small handful of liberals have 
endorsed that the FCC impose that talk radio give equal time to liberal and 
conservative programming), marriage equality, and gay rights. Because it is a 
much more explicitly and unguardedly “political” document, because it strays 
widely from Dobson’s expertise about the family, and because it comes from the 
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end of Dobson’s career as a public figure, Dobson’s open letter is a much less 
carefully controlled example of the interdiscursivity that defines his rhetoric. Not 
only is Dobson’s knowledge about psychology less relevant here, but Dobson is 
also much less careful to root his arguments in his professional knowledge 
because he is bolder about being a “political” rhetor.  However, even in this 
unguarded and messy artifact, Dobson is careful to locate his arguments within 
religious space and expertise, and he is careful to contrast social order with 
transient chaos. 
The curious epistolary conceit the text uses is that Dobson is writing to his 
fellow American in a dystopian future that has come to pass just four years in the 
future. After an introduction that explains that the letter from the future is 
meant to describe what could happen were Barack Obama elected rather than a 
prediction of what would happen (a prescient bit of hedging since none of 
Dobson’s predictions came true), Dobson opens his letter with a curious patriotic 
flourish: 
I can hardly sing “The Star Spangled Banner” any more. When I hear the 
words,  
O say, does that star spangled banner yet wave  
O’er the land of the free and the home of the brave? 
I get tears in my eyes and a lump in my throat. Now in October of 2012, 
after seeing what has happened in the last four years, I don’t think I can 
still answer, “Yes,” to that question. (2) 
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While Dobson does not frame the contrast between 2008 and 2012 as explicitly 
Christian, the move he makes here creates the kind of temporal dislocation that 
defines religious rhetoric in a particularly complex way. By becoming a time 
traveling narrator, Dobson imagines himself apart from normal temporal space, 
and Dobson’s use of the national anthem, a song designed to be used in a 
ceremonial context, suggests sacredness. Paradoxically, the break with normal 
temporal space finds Dobson writing from a world that has fallen prey to the 
worst aspects of the chaos of social experiment. The conclusion of the letter puts 
this dislocation in a more specifically religious context: 
I still believe God is sovereign over all history, and though I don’t know 
why he has allowed these events, it is still his purpose that will ultimately 
be accomplished. He alone can say of all history, “There is none like me, 
declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not 
yet done, saying, “My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my 
purpose” (Isaiah 46:9-10). (16) 
Just as in his 1993 stem cell letter, Dobson uses sacred space to imagine a 
dystopia.  
 While this rambling and explicitly political (in the narrow sense that 
Dobson would define the word rather than the way articulation theory 
understands it) message does not use Dobson’s professional knowledge as 
centrally as texts that more directly concern the family or sexuality, Dobson is 
careful to frame the letter as expert opinion rather than polemic. Throughout the 
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text, Dobson includes copious citations in his footnotes, which send an unusual 
mixed signal. This document is simultaneously a dystopian (perhaps Jeremiadic) 
speculative fiction, and a carefully researched, almost pseudo-academic analysis. 
Dobson also ends his letter with a statement advertising that it is meant to be 
understood as something other than “political”: “This letter may be reproduced 
without change and in its entirety for noncommercial and nonpolitical purposes 
without prior permission from Focus on the Family Action.” (Of course, this kind 
of statement might also be understood as an effort to protect Focus on the 
Family’s non-profit status.). While the exhaustive nature of the text means that 
Dobson cannot always relate every issue to parenting and families, he is 
preoccupied with doing so whenever possible. For example, in a section about 
marriage equality, he worries about how same-sex marriage would affect the Boy 
Scouts and how it would affect Christian private schools (4-5). For Dobson, the 
family is the center of social order, and it is the prism through which social 
change is understood. 
James Dobson and Evangelical mental health care 
 I have, through my analysis of key texts from Dobson’s career, 
demonstrated the importance of interdiscursivity in his work, and my analysis 
suggest how such a rhetorical strategy allowed Dobson, a research psychologist 
and family councilor by training, to play a prominent role in American public 
life. By articulating his expert responses to his field to a broad perspective about 
social order, a perspective that depends not just upon conservative difference to 
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tradition but also upon religious authority, Dobson created a new rhetorical 
space for social conservatism and pioneered what is now a huge Christian mental 
health industry. Dobson’s public career is filled with paradox. He has been a 
powerful voice for the American Right, but his power depends, in part, upon an 
expertise-oriented ethos acquired from decades of abstinence from direct 
participation in conventional partisan politics. Focus on the Family and The 
Family Research Council are important organizations in the history of the 
Religious Right, but Dobson is not primarily a religious rhetor. Perhaps most 
importantly, he helped shape American political discourse while maintaining his 
independence from the political establishment. 
As my analysis in this chapter demonstrates, whenever James Dobson has 
been a conventional political rhetor (a rhetor arguing directly about public policy 
or elections) his work contains the same kinds of articulations and paradoxes 
that inform his writing about the family. The position that he created for himself 
in his work as a parenting expert was a useful one from which to participate in 
debates about public policy, and whenever Dobson has stepped onto the bigger 
public stage, he has carried with him the broad perspective about social order 
that he constructed through his work as a mental health expert speaking 
primarily to conservative Christians. Political work requires incommensurable 
combinations of discourse, and we can see throughout Dobson’s career the 
strategic deployment of an interdiscursivity that creates complex articulations. 
Dobson’s “political” texts contain logical arguments and moral outrage, but more 
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importantly, they suggest, through their use of different argumentative strategies 
drawn from different kinds of authority, a worldview.  
 In my consideration of Dobson’s rhetoric I have pushed aside a crucial 
issue: the relationship between Dobson’s use of arguments drawn from his 
expertise as a mental health professional and contemporary research and 
practices of mental health disciplines is a more contentious one than I have 
acknowledged. While Dobson is a scientifically-oriented expert engaging a 
particular public, his arguments do always not reflect the consensus of the 
mental health care establishment. My setting this issue aside is particularly 
glaring since Dobson’s stances about same-sex relationships has become 
increasingly out of step with that of mainstream psychology. The 
heteronormative, patriarchal view of the family that Dobson (along with the 
organizations he founded) espouses is drawn from his expertise as a 
psychologist, and his arguments do respond to cultural tensions in mental health 
care, but Dobson’s views about same-sex relationships have remained 
impervious to contemporary research and to shifting social dynamics of the past 
few decades. Because of its harsh stance on homosexuality, The Southern 
Poverty Law Center currently lists The Family Research Council as a hate group. 
To state the case bluntly, when Dobson, Focus on the Family, or The Family 
Research Council use evidence drawn from mental health expertise to argue 
about same-sex relationships, they wildly misrepresent what contemporary 
psychology knows about same-sex relationships. (Dobson’s attitude toward 
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same-sex marriage is perhaps the most conspicuous example, but, it is hardly the 
only place where his version of social conservatism is at odds with contemporary 
mental health research. For example, Focus on the Family’s website 
recommends A Solitary Sorrow, a book about helping women cope with “post 
abortion syndrome,” which the APA does not recognize.) 
 This problem is not a flaw in my argument, but a complication that points 
toward further research. The discussion of Dobson’s use of mental health care 
expertise in my second chapter demonstrates that although Dobson’s arguments 
sometimes diverge from consensus in psychology, his arguments respond to 
both the cultural predicament of mental health care and to Dobson’s experience 
as a researcher and clinician. The intersection of religion, politics, and science 
that Dobson’s work represents is a rich one, and if it necessarily makes talking 
about him as a popularizer of scientific knowledge problematic, it presents 
opportunities to do exciting work about how expert knowledge operates in 
specific rhetorical contexts. As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, 
rhetorical strategies that articulate expert knowledge to particular circumstances 
can yield powerful results that defy our expectations. 
 In my concluding chapter, “Looking Forward: Expertise and Evangelical 
Mental Health Care,” I will discuss the future of this project. So far, I have 
described the interdiscursive strategies James Dobson used to initiate a 
politicized Christian mental health care project, I have discussed how the 
conversation about parenting and marriage contained in Dobson’s work create a 
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particular vision of social conservatism, and I have demonstrated how Dobson’s 
interdiscursive strategies empowered him as a political rhetor. As I pursue this 
project further I want to begin looking at the practices of Christian therapists. 
My analysis of Dobson’s rhetoric suggests serious questions about the political 
consequences of using expert knowledge in specific contexts, and I believe that it 
presents new directions for rhetoricians interested in science. I will, in the next 
chapter, discuss briefly some of the complications to our discussions of public 
expertise that my work suggests, and I will discuss my intention to study the 
ways that the articulations contained in the rhetoric of conservative Christian 
mental health care affects the practices of actual Christian therapists. When 
James Dobson began practicing as a therapist, Christian mental health care was 
in its infancy. Today there are several large professional organizations for mental 
health professionals who identify as Evangelicals and who understand their work 
as being a faith based enterprise. Christian mental health care is a complex 
intersection of science based practice, religion, and politics, and it is a fertile site 
for future scholarship in rhetoric.  
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CHAPTER V 
LOOKING FORWARD 
Expertise and Evangelical Mental Health Care 
 
When I was completing this dissertation in the spring of 2013, the 
Supreme Court was hearing two cases that attracted widespread media 
attention: whether or not to uphold a lower court’s overturning of California’s 
ban on same-sex marriage and whether or not to overturn the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (which prevented the federal government from recognizing same-
sex marriages granted by states). The argument put forth by the conservative 
side in both cases was that marriage should be defined by its “procreative 
potential.”  The kind of biologically oriented rhetoric James Dobson helped to 
create in the early 70s remains central to social conservative rhetoric, so much so 
that attempts to link biology to social order might turn out to be the last stand 
for the Religious Right. To posit “procreative potential” as the justification for 
marriage is to argue for a sort of “fit” between biology, social norms, civil rights, 
and religion. The interdiscursivity implicit in the concept is not only strongly 
reminiscent of James Dobson’s efforts to relate a particular parenting style based 
on behaviorism to a moral perspective; the phrase “procreative potential” is a 
stark reminder that arguments derived from biology can take many different 
forms. The normative point of view espoused by opponents of marriage equality 
seems foreign to biology, but articulation allows for surprising, even paradoxical, 
uses of scientific rhetoric. 
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James Dobson is, of course, not the sole originator of such strategies, nor 
was he, despite being one of its earliest and most prominent proponents, the sole 
inventor of conservative Christian mental health care. But he is undoubtedly the 
most important rhetor associated with this project. Because he is not a 
conventional partisan rhetor, he has been often overlooked as a major force in 
American conservatism, but he has been a guiding force within the Religious 
Right for decades. The Focus on the Family radio program is ubiquitous in 
conservative Evangelical households, and Dobson’s books and home videos are 
essential items for the libraries of conservative churches across the United 
States. Dobson was an early and important participant in the construction of 
both conservative Christian mental health care and Evangelical popular culture.  
Although he is as a complex rhetor whose life’s work was as a family therapist 
working through mass media rather than as a polemicist or politician, those 
interested in the Religious Right cannot ignore the impact of a rhetor whose 
expert advice is so emphatically articulated to a political perspective.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have engaged Evangelical mental health 
care using what James Jasinski describes as a “concept oriented” approach 
(139).  My project is designed not only to understand Dobson’s career better, but 
also to develop agentive interdiscursivity, an idea important but implicit in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, into a well-developed lens for close reading. 
Articulation theory is an obvious precedent and influence on other rhetorical 
projects (particularly Michael McGee’s ideographic criticism), but my 
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exploration of the ways that Dobson uses incommensurable combinations of 
argumentative strategies models a potentially valuable new way to incorporate 
hegemonic theory into rhetoric, particularly because it pushes us to consider the 
relationship between rhetoric and agency.   
One reason Dobson’s project is a particularly valuable site for rhetoricians 
is that Dobson’s work demonstrates surprising, even troubling, uses of expertise 
in public debate. Johanna Hartelius uses the term “multifarious expertise” to 
describe rhetors “whose education predicts knowledge in one specific subject 
matter . . . , but whose expert opinion is solicited and circulated in media.”  At 
first glance, it seems as though “multifarious expertise” is simply an overly 
suspicious description of the kind of knowledge characteristic of any public 
intellectual, but the problem of how to understand the articulation of logic, 
knowledge, and authority drawn from specific expertise to complex arguments 
that do not neatly fit into a particular disciplinary space is much too prescient for 
such a dismissive response. James Dobson and other conservative Christians 
who use mental health rhetoric are, of course, especially “multifarious” experts, 
but the kind of rhetorical problem they present is hardly unique. Richard 
Dawkins is a biologist who has used his authority and expertise to become an 
influential participant in discussions about theology, philosophy, politics, 
feminism, and history. Richard A. Muller is a physicist with no expertise in 
climate science who has used arguments drawn from his discipline to participate 
in debates about global warming. Popular applications of academic research like 
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Stephen Levitt’s “Freakanomics” project, the TED conferences, or Malcolm 
Gladwell’s writing present even more complex combinations of disciplined 
knowledge, politics, and culture.  Multifarious expertise is an important aspect of 
contemporary public life. 
Evangelical mental health care is particularly useful point of departure for 
discussions of expertise because the tensions surrounding Evangelical mental 
health care are so strongly felt. When James Dobson uses his knowledge of 
developmental psychology to make arguments about the reasons for the 
dramatic social disruptions of the late 1960s, some audiences will certainly balk 
at the expansiveness of Dobson’s argument and at the reductive way that he 
understands social turmoil. More troublingly, some of Dobson’s opinions are 
immune to new research; James Dobson will continue to insist that children 
need both a father and a mother regardless of what social scientists say. Since 
the problems with Dobson’s work are so readily apparent, he presents a 
particular challenge. If our response to Dobson is to regard him as a dishonest or 
illegitimate rhetor, what implications does his example have for other experts 
who are concerned with complex social or philosophical problems that do not fit 
neatly into their disciplinary knowledge? More immediately, what are we to do 
with the Christian mental health project that that Dobson helped to initiate?  
I have, I hope, already demonstrated that I reject a view of conservative 
Evangelical mental health care as simply a corrupt or dishonest enterprise. 
While citizens have a responsibility to reject arguments drawn from expertise 
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when the strain between a rhetorical strategy and the circumstances of a case are 
too great, and while my interest in James Dobson stems in part by from my own 
discomfort with American social conservatism, Evangelical mental health care is 
too valuable and too sophisticated an enterprise to discount so easily. Some 
might see Dobson’s use of mental health rhetoric in politics as cynical or wrong; 
we should instead understand Dobson as a rhetor working to reimagine the 
relationship between therapeutic expertise and public life. Dobson articulated 
together a worldview from religious conviction, conservative sentiment, and 
therapeutic expertise. If the strange hybrid he created seems cobbled together 
from incongruent parts, Laclau and Mouffe remind us that so too is any 
ideological position.   
My ambition for this dissertation is that it will be the starting point for a 
larger project about conservative Christian mental health care. This project 
would offer insight into the ways that all mental health practitioners negotiate 
with specific social contexts, it would suggest new insights about the nature of 
religious rhetoric, and it would offer new ways to discuss American 
conservatism. As I turn my attention toward this larger investigation, I need to 
frame my project with a deeper consideration, however tentative, of how to 
define conservative Christian mental health. Intersections between conservative 
Christianity and mental health rhetoric include a wide spectrum of potential 
categories to consider. Medical practitioners who are indistinguishable from 
secular providers, mainline ministers who have professional degrees in a mental 
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health field, credentialed non-practitioners who work in “ministries” concerned 
with disseminating expert advice to an Evangelical audience (like James 
Dobson), and people without any institutional credentials in either religion or 
psychiatry might be understood as being a part of conservative Christian mental 
health care.  
The remainder of this chapter will attempt to find purchase within this 
wooly topic. I will describe three professional organizations that suggest the 
kinds of practitioners who might be of particular interest. While my description 
of conservative Christian mental health care is more of a thumbnail sketch than 
a well-developed taxonomy, it suggests starting points for future research about 
intersections between mental health care, religion, and politics. I am not yet 
charting a course for the future of this project; I am instead describing promising 
points of departure. 
What is Christian mental health care anyway? 
Christian mental health care includes professionals with various degrees 
of ideological commitment to religion, to conservative Evangelical politics (some 
Christian therapists have no such commitments, of course), and to biomedical 
psychiatric discourse. Christian mental health care includes a broad spectrum of 
professional service and advocacy, and it includes different kinds of advocacy, 
from Evangelism to partisan political work to defenses of mental health care. My 
goal at this point is merely to identify a handful of organizations that have 
meaningful relationships to both religion and to mental health care so that I can 
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begin to consider the different kind of therapists who might be of particular 
interest.  My examination of James Dobson’s work offers an example of the sort 
of rhetorical work done in popular Evangelical mental health discourse. What is 
the relationship between the public face of Evangelical mental health care the 
practices of actual therapists? How do therapists combine religion with mental 
health care? To what extent are they politically invested?  To what extent are 
they invested in debates surrounding the biomedical in mental health care? The 
discussion below, which briefly describes three professional organizations, does 
not offer a definitive portrait of the variety of intersections between 
contemporary Christianity and therapy, but it offers suggestively contrasting 
versions of Christian mental healthcare. 
 The American Association for Pastoral Counseling is an organization for 
pastors with graduate degrees in a mental health field or with some form of 
professional certification. AAPC’s website is especially concerned with issues of 
professional credibility and gatekeeping. AAPC includes a diversity of Christian 
perspectives and is not primarily an Evangelical or conservative organization. 
The site includes a long description of the requirements for receiving an AAPC 
“Pastoral Councilor” certification: 
Under the auspices of AAPC, pastoral counseling adheres to rigorous 
standards of excellence, including education and clinical training, 
professional certification and licensure. Typical education for the AAPC- 
certified pastoral counselor consists of study that leads to: 
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 a bachelor’s degree from an accredited college or university 
 a three-year professional degree from a seminary 
 a specialized masters or doctoral degree in the mental health 
field 
A significant portion of this education is spent in clinical training. 
Post-graduate training involves completion of at least 1,375 hours of 
supervised clinical experience (that is, the counselor provides individual, 
group, marital and family therapy) and 250 hours of direct approved 
supervision of the therapist’s work in both crisis and long-term situations. 
(AAPC) 
Not only are the criteria for membership in AAPC rigorous, but the 
organization’s website is entirely concerned with issues that a secular therapist 
would be concerned about. While AAPC is made up of ministers, it seems, at first 
glance, entirely consistent with the kind of professional organization that secular 
therapists would join. 
The Board of Christian Professional and Pastoral Counselors is a more 
specifically Evangelical organization. To become certified by BCPPC, a therapist 
needs a postgraduate degree, an ongoing professional practice, and liability 
insurance. The biggest differences between BCPPC and AAPC are that BCPPC 
includes counselors who are not ministers and that BCPPC is more rigorous in 
its definition of Christianity. The organizational website contains a doctrinal 
statement, presented in a bullet list. BCPPC members are supposed to believe: 
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 In one God, creator and sustainer of all things, infinitely perfect and 
eternally co-existing in three persons – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
 The Scriptures, both the Old and New Testaments, are the inspired and 
trustworthy Word of God, the complete revelation of His will for the 
salvation of human beings, and the final authority for all matters about 
which it speaks. 
 That human nature derives from two historical persons, male and female, 
created in God’s image. They were created perfect, but they sinned, 
plunging themselves and all human beings into sin, guilt, suffering, and 
death. 
 That the substitutionary death of Jesus Christ and His bodily resurrection 
provide the only grounds for justification, forgiveness, and salvation for 
all who believe, and only those who trust in Him alone are born of the 
Holy Spirit, true members of the Church, and will spend eternity with 
Christ. 
 That the Holy Spirit is the agent of regeneration and renewal for believers 
in Christ, that He makes the presence of Jesus Christ real in believers, and 
that He comforts, guides, convicts, and enables believers to live in ways 
that honor Him. 
 That ministry to persons also acknowledges the complexity of humans as 
physical, psychological, social, and spiritual beings. The ultimate goal of 
Christian counseling is to help others move to personal wholeness, 
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interpersonal competence, mental stability, and spiritual maturity. 
(BCPPC) 
BCPPC works harder at making sure that everyone agrees what “Christian” is. Do 
therapists who join BCPPC understand themselves as a part of a political 
project? Do they understand therapy in a specifically religious way?  
 The Psychiatry section group of the Christian Medical and Dental 
Association is much more explicitly interested in advocating Evangelical 
Christianity than either the AAPC or the BCPPC, and their newsletters often 
discuss disagreements between secular medicine and Evangelical Christianity.  
Ethical issues surrounding sexuality and psychiatry are of particularly interest in 
the organization’s newsletters and conferences. Mainstream mental health care’s 
acceptance of LGTB identities is a sticking point for the organization, and the 
issue of helping gay Evangelical Christians to live a heterosexual lifestyle is of 
particular interest. Other topics where the Christian Medical and Dental 
Association disagree with secular psychiatry include abortion, divorce, and 
exorcism. This group is particularly interesting, as they are, of the three 
organizations surveyed here, both the most clearly articulated to biomedical 
psychiatry and the most emphatically conservative and Evangelical. How do the 
members of this group understand the conflicts between their faith and 
mainstream psychiatry? Do they see themselves as therapists who happen also to 
be Evangelical Christians, or do they understand their practices as having a 
religious dimension?  
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Christian mental health care and public life 
The chimera that Dobson constructed, a political philosophy built out of 
mental health care and Evangelicalism, suggests fundamental epistemological 
problems with which any theory of psychology must contend. As different as 
biomedical mental health care and Evangelical Christianity are, they can both be 
understood as efforts to describe the complex, hybrid realities of human 
psychology in ways that seek to manage the unsolvable, amorphous cultural-
philosophical problems that describing “the mind” can present.22 That Dobson is 
able to combine these two discourses in such a powerful way speaks not only to 
his ability as a rhetor, but to the inherent messiness of the philosophical 
problems with which mental health care must contend. We can see these 
problems bubble to the surface in debates between mental health professionals 
oriented toward biomedical psychiatry and those who advocate an interpersonal 
approach, and we seem these problems in popular complaints about how 
increasingly widespread psychiatric diagnosis has become. Editorials 
complaining about psychopharmacology are, at this point, something of a cliché.  
Conservative Christian mental health care is, because it introduces explicit 
politics into these tensions, a particularly rich site for thinking about mental 
health, and it is a promising site for a broader exploration of the work that 
Modernist discourse does.23  
James Dobson is an oddly neglected figure, and the conservative 
Evangelical mental health project he helped to pioneer is a rich but scarcely 
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acknowledged site for the study of expertise in public life. Articulation theory 
asks us to broaden our understanding of politics to include cultural work, and if 
we accept Laclau’s and Mouffe’s description of political work as fundamentally 
incommensurable, the intersections of mental health care and religion that 
Dobson’s work represents should be understood as sophisticated efforts to 
address complex problems rather than illegitimate appropriations of mental 
health discourse.  A cursory glance at the larger Christian mental health care 
project that Dobson helped to pioneer suggests that Christian mental health care 
is a complex and diverse series of sites where rhetoric might uncover even more 
rich articulations of expertise to specific social contexts. 
Aspects of Dobson’s work are problematic, but he deserves to be taken 
seriously,  not only because  he has helped to popularize important therapeutic 
practices like marriage counseling and grief counseling, but also because he has 
also done pioneering work to help  take away the stigma associated with mental 
health care in conservative communities. Thousands of people suffering from 
abuse, addiction, and depression have benefited from Focus on the Family. 
Evangelical mental health care is an important mechanism for bringing care to 
people who need it. But as valuable as Evangelical health care has proven itself 
to be, we cannot forget that conservative Christian therapists and researchers 
have participated in abusive projects like “reparation therapy” (therapy meant to 
turn people into heterosexuals), and the kind of expertise oriented rhetoric that 
Dobson pioneered often finds its way into public debate in troubling ways. I 
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began this chapter by noting the similarity of Dobson’s rhetoric to arguments 
against marriage equality. This, too, is James Dobson’s legacy. 
My analysis of James Dobson’s rhetorical strategies is a first step in a 
potentially far-reaching investigation. As important as Dobson is as a public 
figure and as a rhetorical innovator, he is in many ways merely the tip of an 
iceberg. Since Dobson began his career, therapeutic rhetoric and conservative 
Christianity have become increasingly intertwined, and Christian mental health 
care has become a sprawling enterprise. The particular intersections of culture, 
religion, politics, and expertise that constitute this project present enormous 
opportunities for rhetoricians.  
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NOTES 
 
1. That figure includes sales of a 1992 revision called The New Dare to Discipline. 
 
 
2. Dobson’s work echoes Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, which also makes a 
broad argument about the how various kinds of “discipline” serve as 
mechanisms of social cohesion. Foucault, of course, also began his career in a 
mental health field, and his earliest work as a philosopher was directly 
influenced by his responses to that field. I have not explored the ways that 
Foucault’s work might respond to Dobson’s conservative attitude toward 
discipline, but there are obvious and interesting points of comparison. 
 
3. While Dobson’s rhetoric is often strikingly moralistic and sometimes 
authoritarian, he can also be surprisingly progressive, particularly in his 
treatment of childhood sexuality. This dissertation is primarily concerned with 
Dobson’s conservative politics, but it should be emphasized that Dobson is a 
more complex figure than his reputation as a conservative firebrand would 
suggest. 
 
4. The Family Research Council has had a somewhat tenuous relationship with 
Focus on the Family, at times being affiliated or even a part of Focus, and at 
other times not. The organizations have also shared board members, including 
Dobson. In 1994 The FRC became completely independent organization, in part 
because the lobbying activity that FRC engaged in threatened Focus’s tax exempt 
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status. The FRC has been a more outspoken and overtly political organization 
than Focus, and has been labeled a hate group for its anti-gay rights advocacy by 
the Southern Poverty Law Center (Southern Poverty Law Center). 
 
5. “Surprising” because Minkowitz is as a feminist writer who covers gay and 
lesbian issues. She is a GLAAD award winner, and she is perhaps most known 
for uncovering the story of Brandon Teena. 
 
6. As someone with a PhD, James Dobson is a doctor, and he is allowed to use the 
title. However, since he writes for a popular audience that is likely unfamiliar 
with the distinctions between psychiatrists, psychologists, and other kinds of 
therapists, at the very least, “Dr.” seems designed to carry a medical connotation, 
particularly since Dobson clearly uses the label to hint at his therapeutic 
experience rather than his academic authority. In his popular work, he discusses 
his experience with clients, not his scholarly research. 
 
7.
 I am aware that I seem to make broad generalizations at this point. Because my 
analysis is grounded in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s articulation theory, the cultural 
work that discourses do are more important than the subtleties we might find 
when looking more closely at the communities that they represent. I do not 
mean to say that an Evangelical Christian has a simple, easily defined idea about 
the family. I mean to say that Evangelical Christianity, when it is a part of a 
controversy, depends on different assumptions than psychology. 
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8. Even though I will set aside these concerns about disciplinarily and legitimacy 
for now, I do not mean to say that this worry is invalid. There are certainly 
important questions about legitimacy to consider when science is used in 
political debate, and I will acknowledge them in my last chapter through a 
consideration of the problem of the “multifarious expert.”  
 
9.
 Psychiatry has been attractive for study for two reasons. First of all, psychiatry 
can be studied as a part of the already established “medical rhetoric” project. 
Secondly, psychiatry, which began in professional journals among asylum 
keepers during the eighteenth century, was the only mental health care 
discipline until the twentieth century, and so it offers scholars a bigger tradition 
to study.  
 
10. Michele Foucault and Erving Goffman also made influential arguments about 
how psychiatry is articulated to cultural expectations. Although neither approved 
of the label, Foucault and Szasz are often mentioned as the fathers of “anti-
psychiatry. 
  
11. Laclau’s argument is that populism is an expression of angst that is related to 
capitalism. Populism uses pre-capitalist symbolism (often agrarian) to construct 
a rhetoric of opposition between some kind of authentic folk culture and 
contemporary technological culture 
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12. In recent years, Dobson’s work has become increasingly out of touch with 
contemporary psychology, and his writing has become increasingly polemical, so 
much so that his missives have sometimes pushed against the boundaries of 
Focus on the Family’s non-profit status. I want to remind my reader that this 
dissertation, chapter four excepted, is concerned with Dobson’s influential 
formative work, which is more clearly articulated to mainstream mental health 
care and more narrowly concerned with parenting advice. I also want to remind 
the reader that I am concerned with importance of therapeutic discourse in 
Evangelical Christian popular culture, not with assessing the validity of applied 
psychology in a conservative Christian context. Dobson remained, until his 
retirement from the organization, intimately involved with coordinating the 
mental health outreach in which Focus on the Family engages. Someone familiar 
only with Dobson’s more recent public statements might quarrel with my 
emphasis on Dobson as a psychologist rather than a polemicist, but Dobson’s 
role as a public mental health advocate is central to his importance in the 
Evangelical community and to his influence on the conservative movement. 
 
13. Dobson is a psychologist, and not a medical doctor, but characterizing his 
rhetoric as “medical” is, in this case, fair. The slippery nature of mental health 
care allows for rhetors like Dobson to use philosophical, practical, and medical 
arguments. It is worth noting that when he was a practicing psychologist, 
Dobson worked in a hospital and his research is about developmental 
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difficulties. He is not an M.D., but he has connections to physical medicine that 
not every psychologist has. 
 
14. Randall Lake’s “Order and Disorder in Anti-abortion Rhetoric: A Logological 
View” is an example of rhetorical analysis that adheres closely to Burke’s work 
on religion. 
 
15. Defining religious rhetoric as rhetoric that constructs sacredness through 
setting apart is also reminiscent of Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane, 
which argues that religion is defined by the creation of sacred spaces that 
provide anchor points for the ordering of reality. 
 
16. Dobson published What Wives Wish Their Husbands Knew about Women in 
the interim. What Wives Wish Their Husbands Know about Women is a 
fascinating text that fits into the larger project analyzed in this dissertation, but 
it is not as politically invested as Dare to Discipline and The Strong Willed Child. 
 
17. In my justification for the analysis in this chapter, I have glossed over an 
important issue: agency. The model of an autonomous agent making choices 
about strategy that I suggest is, to some degree, in tension with postmodern 
cultural theory, which suggests that subjectivity is contingent upon social and 
discursive context. The neglect of this tension is one of the concerns of Dillip 
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Goankar’s “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science.” I will not address 
this issue at length, but I will note that my concept of subjectivity follows 
Herndl’s and Lacona’s “Shifting Agency: Agency, Kairos, and the Possibilities of 
Social Action,” which I cite in my introductory chapter. Herndl and Licona, in an 
effort to mediate between classical rhetorical and postmodern theories of 
subjectivity, argue for a notion constrained agency that exists within different 
social, institutional, and discursive positions. Agency and identity might be 
contingent, but humans can make choices about where they position themselves. 
The reader will note the influence of Herndl and Licona in some of my own 
rhetorical choices; when I say that I understand articulation theory in terms of 
“discursive opportunity” or when I say that Dobson “occupied a position” 
through a rhetorical strategy I am following Herndl’s and Licona’s work about 
agency. 
 
18. For more information about the specifics of Dobson’s long but sometimes 
contentious relationship to the Republican Party, see Dale Buss’s Family Man or 
Dan Gilgoff’s The Jesus Machine: How James Dobson, Focus on the Family, 
and Evangelical America Are Winning the Culture War. 
 
19. The most disturbing artifacts described in the report, child pornography and 
bestiality, were not purchased or produced in the United States, but seized by 
customs. The choice to include unsettling descriptions of child pornography 
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alongside descriptions of the commercial pornography industry suggests that the 
commission understood all depictions of sex as criminal. 
 
20. Dobson’s blurring of consensual sex practices carried out by adults with child 
abuse and rape is one of the more problematic aspects of his statement, and my 
treatment of this element of his argument deserves comment. My rhetorical 
choices attempt to convey Dobson’s characterization of pornography as extreme 
and violent, but I disagree with the way Dobson pathologizes sexual practices 
that fall outside of “conventional” heterosexual intercourse. For example, I use 
the word “deviance” above in my characterization of Dobson’s description of 
pornography to suggest the perspective put forth in the statement, not to 
endorse Dobson’s point of view. I also want to emphasize that the socially 
conscious alternative pornography produced by feminist, kink, or queer activists 
that exists today did not exist in 1986, nor did the more permissive but still 
critical attitude toward pornography that many feminists have adopted. 
Contemporaneous feminists like Robin Morgan, whose maxim “Pornography is 
the theory; rape is the practice” is quoted by Dobson (through Dworkin), were 
outspoken in their condemnation. As a feminist, I find much to sympathize with 
in Dobson’s concerns, but I find his wholesale disgust at sexuality unlike his own 
to be dangerous. The passage quoted above reveals that Dobson’s idea of erotica 
that reflects a healthy sexual appetite is “images of simple heterosexual nudity,” 
meaning images of women intended for men. One of the more chilling moments 
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in Dobson’s statement is his complaint that adult bookstores are “centers of 
disease and homosexual activity.” The Meese report, and Dobson’s comment on 
it, seems calculated to shock the reader, and while some of the material 
described in the report is deeply disturbing, the attitudes informing the report 
are sometimes even more so. 
 
21. In the following discussion I waffle between discussing Dobson’s expertise as 
specifically “medical” or merely “therapeutic.” Dobson is not a physician, but his 
rhetoric includes the influence of the biomedical, and the artifact analyzed here 
sits between medical and therapeutic language. Sorting out the distinction is, for 
my purposes, largely unnecessary.  
 
22. Richard Rorty’s  Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is a philosopher’s 
extended explication of these problems. 
 
23. I define “Modernism” according to Bruno Latour’s definition. My second 
chapter includes a discussion of Latour and a discussion of Carl Herndl’s 
program for understanding rhetoric as a non-Modern practice. It also explicates 
the tensions surrounding the trend toward biomedical diagnosis in mental 
health care and explains how Dobson responded to this tension. 
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